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MOVING UP THE RESIDENTIAL HIERARCHY:*
A NEW REMEDY FOR AN OLD INJURY ARISING
FROM HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
KATHLEEN C. ENGEL**
Marilyn wanted to move out of the dangerous Chicago
neighborhood in which she lived. She found an apartment in a suburb,
Berwyn, that suited her needs in terms of location, price, and size.
When the landlord refused to deal with her or rent her the apartment,
Marilyn became discouraged and decided to save money, buy a house,
and avoid encountering more discrimination in the rental market.
Marilyn eventually moved to a safer neighborhood, but not soon
enough. Not long after she was denied the apartment in Berwyn, her
son was shot and killed in an act of random violence one block from
the home Marilyn was trying to leave.1
Congress passed the Fair Housing Act2 over thirty years ago, yet housing
discrimination persists. One of the harshest consequences of discrimination
in housing is that upwardly mobile members of protected groups lose access
to desirable communities and the attendant benefits, ranging from safe streets
and good schools to productive role models.3 Fair housing laws and related
case law have neither recognized nor provided a remedy for the loss of
intangible community benefits due to housing discrimination.
* The first use of the term “moving up the residential hierarchy” that I have located appeared in
DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF
THE UNDERCLASS (1996), and refers to moving to communities “with higher home values, safer
streets, higher-quality schools, and better services.” Id. at 14.
** Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College
of Law. A.B. 1982, Smith College; J.D. 1988, University of Texas at Austin.
I would like to thank Tom Bogart, Phyllis Crocker, Jon Entin, Jim Rebitzer, and Michael Selmi
for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper. In addition, I am grateful to Tony
Rodriguez and Jacqueline Williams who inspired my initial exploration of remedies for housing
discrimination.
1. This account is an excerpt from a HOPE Fair Housing Center press release dated April 6,
1999. See also Alan Finder, Blacks Remain Shut Out of Housing in White Areas, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13,
1989 (chronicling a well-educated, professional couple’s frustrated attempts to secure housing in
predominantly white areas).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1994).
3. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note *, at 150 (noting that “by drawing on benefits acquired
through residential mobility, aspiring parents not only consolidate their own class position but enhance
their and their children’s prospects for additional social mobility”) (citing STANLEY LIEBERSON,
ETHNIC PATTERNS IN AMERICAN CITIES 133-90 (1963), and JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH,
URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE 17-49 (1987)).
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1199+Luby.doc 03/22/00   9:27 AM
1154 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 77:1153
In this article, I demonstrate that claims for lost access to desirable
communities can be easily incorporated into an extant category of
compensable injuries under the Fair Housing Act. I then introduce a method
for assessing the value of this injury. In brief, the method compares the price
of housing that a victim of discrimination obtained to the price of the housing
he4 sought and was unlawfully denied to approximate the value of living in
the more desirable community. The virtue of the method is that it provides
adjudicators with a concrete basis for calculating damages for lost access to a
desirable community.
In the first part of the article, I discuss the extent of housing
discrimination in the United States, the role discrimination plays in limiting
people’s access to the bundle of goods and services that desirable
communities provide, the fair housing laws, current remedies under the laws,
and the failure of the laws to provide a remedy to people who are denied
access to desirable communities as a result of discrimination. In Part II, I
describe the method for calculating damages for lost access to a desirable
community and discuss some of its complexities. In Part III, I discuss the
potential impact of these new damage calculations on the fair housing
enforcement scheme.
I. THE PROBLEM AND THE LAW
To understand the benefits of my proposed method for calculating the
value of lost access to a community, it is critical to understand the nature of
the problem and how the law has addressed it. In this Part, I review the data
on rates of housing discrimination in the United States. I then focus on the
opportunities people lose when discrimination prevents them from moving
into more desirable communities. I conclude this Part with a discussion of the
fair housing laws and their failure to provide a remedy for those who are
denied the ability to move up the residential hierarchy.
A. The Prevalence of Housing Discrimination
Studies of housing discrimination reveal persistently high levels of
discrimination against people of color and families with children. A 1979
4. To avoid clumsiness, I refer throughout this article to all plaintiffs/complainants as “he” and
all respondents/defendants as “she.”
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study funded by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(“HUD”) estimated that there were two million incidents of housing
discrimination on the basis of race each year.5 More recent evidence reveals
that high rates of discrimination continue.6 In 1989, a HUD-sponsored fair
housing study of the number of listings shown to prospective buyers and
renters found that in over forty percent of the audits, blacks were shown
fewer listings than whites.7 Similarly, agents showed Hispanic renters fewer
units than whites in thirty-five percent of the audits, and showed Hispanic
buyers fewer units in over forty percent of the audits.8 Other audits have
uncovered even higher rates of housing discrimination, including one study
that found a ninety percent discrimination rate.9 George Galster, using data
from twenty-nine fair housing audits, found that the average discrimination
rate was forty-seven percent.10 In other words, in forty-seven percent of the
housing searches, people of color encountered discrimination.
The rate at which landlords and agencies currently discriminate against
families with children is unknown because the only studies of familial status
discrimination were conducted before the Fair Housing Act11 extended
protection to families with children in 1988.12 Prior to 1988, researchers
5. James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Generation of
Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1052 (1989).
6. See generally Edward Allen, Six Years After Passage of the Fair Housing Amendments Act:
Discrimination Against Families with Children, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 297 (1995); John Yinger,
Testing for Discrimination in Housing and Related Markets, in A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON
DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF TESTING 27 (Michael Fix & Margery Austin Turner eds.,
1999).
7. See JOHN YINGER, CLOSED DOORS, OPPORTUNITIES LOST: THE CONTINUING COSTS OF
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 44, tbl. 3.5 (1995).
8. See id. These measures are based on gross incidents of discrimination. Net measures adjust
for the number of times agents treated applicants of color more favorably than their white counterparts.
When agents “favor” applicants of color, they may be steering them to largely minority communities
that are typically less desirable. Given my concern with the rate at which discrimination impedes
members of protected groups’ access to desirable communities, the gross discrimination rate is the
relevant measure. For a discussion of this issue, see id. at 44-46.
9. See id. at 48 (citing George Galster, Racial Discrimination in Housing Markets During the
1980’s: A Review of the Audit Evidence, 9 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 165-75 (1990)); see also Victoria A.
Roberts, With a Handshake and a Smile: The Fight to Eliminate Housing Discrimination, 73 MICH. B.
J. 276, 278 (1994); Robert G. Schwemm, The Future of Fair Housing Litigation, 26 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 745, 746 n.6 (1993) (citing MARGERY A. TURNER ET AL., HOUSING DISCRIMINATION STUDY:
SYNTHESIS VI-VII (U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV. 1991) (estimating that the incidence rate of
discrimination against black tenants seeking housing was 53% and 46% for Hispanic apartment-
seekers).
10. See Galster, supra note 9, at 167 & tbl. 1, cited in YINGER, supra note 7, at 48.
11. Throughout this article, I refer to the Fair Housing Act as amended in 1988 as “the Act,” “the
FHA” or “the Fair Housing Act.”
12. Pub. L. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988). Some states extended their fair housing laws to
cover families with children before the 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act. See ROBERT G.
SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 11.6(1) (1998).
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estimated that one quarter of landlords refused to rent to families with
children, and that two million incidents of such discrimination occurred
annually.13 Although discrimination against families with children likely has
decreased since passage of the amendments, it certainly has not disappeared.
Between the time of the amendments to the FHA in 1988 and December
1993, familial status claims comprised over half of all claims for which HUD
issued charges of discrimination.14
B. The Impact of Housing Discrimination on the Upwardly Mobile
The community in which people reside determines the quality of the
schools, the safety of the streets, and even the availability of positive role
models. As a result, residents of urban communities often flock to the
suburbs15 where they hope to improve their futures and those of their
children.16 Tight housing markets in desirable suburbs17 can frustrate the
search for housing, and discrimination only makes the situation worse.18
Both society and the individual victims suffer when housing discrimination
prevents people from improving their socioeconomic status by moving up the
residential hierarchy.
Urban schools simply do not have the same resources as suburban school
districts. Poverty, under-funding, and a relatively high percentage of students
who need special services combine to prevent many urban schools from
meeting their educational goals.19 For this reason, parents living in urban
areas often want their children to attend suburban schools. This is evident in
the burgeoning attempts of city parents to use relatives’ addresses and false
documents to establish residency in communities with superior schools.20
13. See Allen, supra note 6, at 300; 134 Cong. Rec. S10,544, S10,553 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1988)
(statement of Sen. Domenici).
14. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1988: THE
ENFORCEMENT REPORT 56-57 (1994).
15. See W. DENNIS KEATING, THE SUBURBAN RACIAL DILEMMA: HOUSING AND
NEIGHBORHOODS 9 (1994).
16. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note *, at 14.
17. I use the comparison between inner cities and suburbs to illustrate my point that there are
benefits to living in some communities rather than others. The variance in the amenities that
communities offer is not just between inner city neighborhoods and suburbs. The quality of services
can differ between one urban neighborhood and another and one suburban neighborhood and another.
18. See Margalynne Armstrong, Desegregation Through Private Litigation: Using Equitable
Remedies to Achieve the Purposes of the Fair Housing Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 909, 917 (1991).
19. See YINGER, supra note 7, at 140-41; see also MASSEY & DENTON, supra note *, at 141.
20. See Tina Nguyen, Sleuths on the Trail of Student Interlopers as Classes Brim, L.A. TIMES,
June 12, 1998, at A1 (documenting the use of private investigators and video cameras to detect
students who are illegally attending schools in districts with strong academic programs in Southern
California); Kim Hill, Illegal Students are Soldiers in the War on Poverty, THE SUN PRESS , May 13,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss4/6
p1199+Luby.doc 03/22/00   9:27 AM
1999] MOVING UP THE RESIDENTIAL HIERARCHY 1157
When discrimination prevents parents from relocating to communities with
quality schools, their children often become trapped in inferior city school
systems.21
Schools are not the only services that are weaker in inner cities.
Inadequate social and medical services can have a negative impact on the
health of inner city residents.22 Housing discrimination can also limit
employment opportunities. If, as some economists and sociologists argue,
many skilled and low-skilled jobs are moving out of urban areas and into the
suburbs,23 people living in urban areas may not learn of, or have
transportation to, good jobs.24 Reduced job opportunities due to residential
segregation lead to lower earnings and further limit socioeconomic
advancement.
Other advantages that accrue to people living in good communities are
less tangible, but equally important. For example, children and adults benefit
from having role models who are engaged in productive economic activity.25
In contrast, people living in impoverished parts of cities often “learn what
they live” and therefore are more likely to commit crimes, use alcohol and
drugs, fail to achieve at school, and have children out of wedlock.26 Urban
decay and dangerous streets also can prevent people from developing
1999, at A5 (opining that the children who falsify their place of residence in order to obtain good
suburban educations are heroes trying to achieve educational opportunity).
21. Although some might assume that people living in inner cities cannot afford to move to the
suburbs, economists have found that socioeconomic status alone does not explain the relatively low
number of people of color living in the suburbs. See CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE 6
(1996); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note *, at 85.
22. See Akwasi Osei, The Persistence of Differing Trends in African American Mortality and
Morbidity Rates, in THE METROPOLIS IN BLACK AND WHITE 128, 137-39 (George C. Galster &
Edward W. Hill eds., 1992).
23. See YINGER, supra note 7, at 147; WILLIAM J. WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS 37-42,
65-66 (1996).
24. See Jeffrey S. Lehman, Updating Urban Policy, in CONFRONTING POVERTY 242 (Sheldon
Danziger ed., 1994). See also ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE,
HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 112 (1992) (noting that residential segregation reduces the opportunities even of
middle class blacks).
25. See George C. Galster, Polarization, Place and Race, in RACE, POVERTY AND AMERICAN
CITIES 186, 196 (John Charles Boger & Judith Welch Wegner eds., 1996). See also WILSON, supra
note 23, at 63.
26. See Ronald B. Mincy, The Underclass: Concept, Controversy and Evidence, in
CONFRONTING POVERTY 119-21 (Sheldon H. Danziger et al. eds., 1994); see also YINGER, supra note
7, at 155 (citing a number of studies correlating neighborhood effects with economic and educational
outcomes while controlling for personal characteristics that might account for people’s relative
success); WILSON, supra note 23, at 63.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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supportive relationships with neighbors, churches, and other social
institutions.27
Perhaps the most intriguing evidence of the benefits that accrue to people
who move out of inner cities and into good suburbs arises out of the
Gautreaux Program in Chicago. The Gautreaux Program, which was
developed as part of a remedy in a public housing segregation case, gave
vouchers to residents of Chicago that they could use to obtain housing in
predominantly middle class suburbs or in low income areas of the city.28
Thousands of people participated in the Gautreaux Program with over half
electing to live in the suburbs.29 Researchers who studied the educational and
employment progress of the participants found that adults who moved to the
suburbs were twenty-five percent more likely to have jobs than those who
used their vouchers to acquire housing in the city.30 The suburban children
also fared better than the children whose parents had elected to use their
vouchers in the city. For example, their drop-out rate was fifteen percent
lower than that of their city counterparts.31 Likewise, twenty-seven percent of
the suburban youth enrolled in four-year colleges and universities, while only
four percent of the city students went on to similar programs.32 Finally, the
suburban participants who did not go to college received higher wages and
had better workplace benefits than their urban counterparts.33
Although the people who used their vouchers to secure housing in the
suburbs may have been more ambitious or capable than those who stayed in
the city, the increased economic and educational opportunities in the suburbs
may have allowed the suburban Gautreaux participants to succeed in ways
that might not have been feasible if they had remained in the City. When
discrimination prevents people living in disadvantaged communities from
making similar transitions, it reduces their potential for upward mobility.
27. See Galster, supra note 25, at 201-02; see also MASSEY & DENTON, supra note *, at 137-38
(describing how the social disorder that often accompanies areas permeated with poverty leads to
alienation and fear within communities); WILSON, supra note 23, at 63.
28. See James E. Rosenbaum et al., Can the Kerner Commission’s Housing Strategy Improve
Employment, Education and Social Integration for Low-Income Blacks?, in RACE, POVERTY AND
AMERICAN CITIES 273, 273 (John Charles Boger & Judith Welch Wegner eds., 1996).
29. See id. at 275.
30. See id. at 280. The suburban participants attributed their labor market success to more jobs in
the area, greater safety, positive role models and social norms. See id.
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C. The Fair Housing Laws
The primary federal legislation prohibiting discrimination in housing is
the Fair Housing Act, which became law in 1968.34 In 1988, in response to
criticism that the Act’s enforcement mechanisms were ineffective, Congress
passed the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988.35 The amendments
provided more extensive protection and additional enforcement
mechanisms.36
The key and most-litigated provision of the Act as amended makes it
unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to
refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or
deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial
status, or national origin.”37
Sections 1981 and 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 186638 provide
supplemental avenues for relief, as does the Constitution39 in claims against
governmental entities, including the United States. In addition, many states
and localities have their own fair housing legislation providing for an array of
enforcement mechanisms and remedies,40 and extending protection to classes
of individuals beyond those covered by the Act.41
34. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631
(1994)).
35. Pub. L. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631
(1994)).
36. Key revisions included removing a $1000 cap on punitive damages, expanding the relief
available in claims initiated by the DOJ, granting HUD enforcement power, eliminating a provision
that limited awards of attorneys’ fees and costs to those who were unable to pay the fees and costs
themselves, and expanding the protected classes to include families and the disabled. See also
SCHWEMM, supra note 12, at §§ 1, §§ 5.3, 25.3(5)(a); Eugene R. Gaetke & Robert G. Schwemm,
Government Lawyers and their Private “Clients” Under the Fair Housing Act, 65 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 329, 335-38 (1997); Leland B. Ware, New Weapons for an Old Battle: The Enforcement
Provisions of the 1988 Amendments to the Fair Housing Act, 7 AM. U. ADMIN. L.J. 59 (1993).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1994). The Act also protects handicapped persons. See § 3604(f)(1).
Other prohibitions can be found in § 3604(b) (discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
the sale or rental); § 3604(c) (discriminatory advertising); § 3604(d) (misrepresentations about the
availability of housing); and § 3604(e) (blockbusting). The Fair Housing Act exempts a landlord from
liability if the subject property is a single-family house that the owner is selling or renting, or the unit
has four or fewer units and the owner lives in one of the units. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b). The exemptions
are affirmative defenses. See United States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877, 882 (3d Cir.
1990). Landlords who fall within one of the exemptions may still be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for
race discrimination. See SCHWEMM, supra note 12, at § 9.3(2).
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1994); see also SCHWEMM, supra note 12, at § 27.1 (comparing the
provisions of the Civil Rights Act and the Fair Housing Act).
39. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. For a discussion of the applicability of constitutional claims to
housing discrimination, see SCHWEMM, supra note 12, at § 28.1.
40. SCHWEMM, supra note 12, at § 3.5 & app. C.
41. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2515(a) (1981) (barring discrimination on the basis of marital
Washington University Open Scholarship
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There are four methods for enforcing the provisions of the Act.
Individuals42 most frequently file administrative complaints with HUD.43
Others, alternatively or concurrently, proceed directly to federal or state court
and file private lawsuits.44 The remaining two enforcement methods can be
initiated only by governmental agencies: HUD can file complaints on its
own;45 and the Department of Justice (DOJ) can bring pattern and practice
claims or claims that raise issues of “general public importance.”46
When a complainant takes advantage of the HUD administrative process,
HUD first determines whether to refer the complaint to an equivalent state or
local agency.47 If HUD retains the claim, it conducts a limited investigation
and attempts to conciliate the claim.48 If the claim does not settle during
conciliation, HUD reviews the evidence and determines whether “reasonable
cause” exists to believe that the respondent engaged in unlawful housing
discrimination.49 A finding of no reasonable cause leads to a dismissal.50 If
HUD does find reasonable cause, it issues a charge against the respondent.51
Either or both of the parties may then elect judicial determination,52 in which
case the DOJ will bring a claim on behalf of the complainant in federal court
in the name of the United States.53 Alternatively, the parties can proceed to a
status, personal appearance, family responsibilities, source of income, political affiliation,
matriculation, and place of residence); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B § 4(8) (1998) (prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation).
42. During the administrative process, parties are referred to as complainants and respondents.
SCHWEMM, supra note 12, at §§ 24.1, 24.3(1). For consistency, I use the same terms throughout this
article.
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i); SCHWEMM, supra note 12, at § 24.2.
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i). HUD has been criticized for not taking advantage of this
authority. See Schwemm, supra note 9, at 765-67.
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a). Although the government has the authority to initiate investigations
and file Commissioner’s charges to enforce the Fair Housing Act, at least one scholar contends that
“the government’s enforcement efforts have largely failed.” Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private
Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1401, 1438
(1998).
47. If the state or locality in which a claim arose has fair housing laws that are substantially
equivalent to the Fair Housing Act, HUD must refer the claim to the appropriate state or local agency.
See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(f)(1). HUD refers approximately 40% of the filed claims to state or local fair
housing agencies. See Gaetke & Schwemm, supra note 36, at 343.
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(b)(1).
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g)(1).
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g)(3). The complainant may still bring a private action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 3613. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. See also Marinoff v. HUD, 892 F. Supp. 493, 496-
97 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 78 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 1996).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g)(2)(A).
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a).
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(o); UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 14, at
184.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss4/6
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hearing before a HUD Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).54 HUD is the
named plaintiff in these proceedings.55 Complainants do not bear the costs of
litigation if their interests are represented solely by HUD counsel before an
ALJ or by the DOJ in court;56 however, if they retain private counsel to
intervene on their behalf,57 they pay their attorneys’ fees and litigation costs.
D. Remedies Under the Fair Housing Act
The Fair Housing Act provides an array of potential relief: compensatory
damages, civil penalties, punitive damages, injunctions, and attorney’s fees.
Compensatory damages fall into two categories— tangibles and intangibles—
within which there are a number of subcategories. Tangible damages include
lost wages for time spent searching for alternative housing,58 the cost of
temporary housing, the cost of storing furniture, additional moving costs, the
cost of alternative housing and utilities, losses associated with increased time
and money spent commuting, charges for psychotherapy, and time spent
preparing the case and attending the hearing.59 In addition, when fair housing
organizations bring claims, adjudicators60 can award compensation for the
value of the resources the organizations had to divert from other programs to
litigate the claims.61
Emotional distress constitutes the bulk of the claims for intangible losses.
A complainant can establish emotional distress through direct testimony or
the fact finder can infer it from the evidence even without proof of
“psychological” injury or other medical evidence.62 Other categories of
intangible injuries include loss of civil rights,63 inconvenience,64 and lost
54. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(b).
55. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 103.410(c), 180.310(a) (1998).
56. See Gaetke & Schwemm, supra note 36, at 330.
57. The Fair Housing Act authorizes such intervention. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (intervention in
a hearing before an ALJ); § 3612(o)(2) (intervention in a civil action).
58. “Alternative housing” refers to the housing in which a victim of discrimination resides
following a discriminatory rejection by a landlord, seller or real estate agent.
59. See generally SCHWEMM, supra note 12, at § 25.3(2)(b) (itemizing the various injuries
compensible under the Fair Housing Act); Alan W. Heifetz & Thomas C. Heinz, Separating the
Objective, the Subjective, and the Speculative: Assessing Compensatory Adjudications, 26 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 3, 10-14 (1992) (listing categories of economic damages).
60. I use the word adjudicators because both ALJs and judges render fair housing decisions.
61. Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 59, at 14-17.
62. Id. at 17-18.
63. Until the early 1990’s, adjudicators occasionally awarded presumed damages in fair housing
cases for violations of complainants’ civil rights. See, e.g., HUD v. Murphy, [2A HUD Administrative
Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,002, at 25,053 (July 13, 1990). In
1992, however, the Sixth Circuit, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Memphis Community
School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986), rejected a claim for damages based solely on a
Washington University Open Scholarship
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housing opportunities.65 Adjudicators rarely compensate complainants for
these latter injuries and, when they do, the awards are small.66
Courts can award punitive damages, but may not impose civil penalties.67
Conversely, ALJs can impose civil penalties but cannot award punitive
damages.68 Civil penalties in HUD proceedings are akin to punitive damages
violation of a complainant’s rights under the Fair Housing Act. See Baumgardner v. HUD, 960 F.2d
572, 581-83 (6th Cir. 1992). Since then, deprivations of complainants’ civil rights have generated only
nominal damage awards. See HUD v. Dutra, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair
Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,124, at 26,063 (Nov. 12, 1996); HUD v. French, [2A HUD
Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,113, at 25,978 (Sept.
12, 1995), relief modified based on settlement agreement pending appeal, [2A HUD Administrative
Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,120 (Oct. 1, 1996).
The Baumgardner court did leave open the possibility that there were situations in which it would
be appropriate to award presumed damages based on a violation of the Fair Housing Act. See
Baumgardner, 960 F.2d at 583. See also Woods v. Beavers, 922 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1991) (declining to
reverse trial court decision based on claim that jury instruction allowed an award of presumed
damages).
For arguments in favor of allowing presumed damages for victims of housing discrimination, see
Robert G. Schwemm, Compensatory Damages in Federal Fair Housing Cases, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 83, 94-105 (1981).
64. Adjudicators have inconsistent notions of what constitutes a claim for inconvenience. The
factual foundation needed to support these claims appears to turn on who is hearing the case.
Sometimes inconvenience refers to tangible damages such as increased commuting costs based on the
location of the complainant’s alternative housing. Other times it is more akin to emotional distress
damages. See Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 59, at 24-26.
65. Lost housing opportunity damages can be based on several different types of loss. One ALJ
has awarded lost housing opportunity damages when the lost housing provided intangible benefits that
were “not reflected in the market price of the denied housing or otherwise addressed in the prayer for
damages.” Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 59, at 26. See discussion infra accompanying notes 76-90.
Another ALJ construes complainants’ claims for lost housing opportunity damages as claims for
damages based on their loss of civil rights and awards only nominal damages. See HUD v. DiBari,
HUDALJ 01-90-0511-1, at 11-12 (visited Mar. 7, 2000) <http://www.hud.gov/alj/pdf/dibari.pdf>;
HUD v. Bangs, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.)
¶ 25,040, at 25,418-19 (Jan. 5, 1993).
66. See, e.g., HUD v. Welch, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending
(Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,125, at 26,070 (Dec. 2, 1996) (awarding $500 for lost housing opportunity);
HUD v. Wagner, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law &
Bus.) ¶ 25,032, at 25,338 (June 22, 1992) (awarding $350 for lost housing opportunities); HUD v.
Frisbie, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.)
¶ 25,030, at 25,326-27 (May 6, 1992) (awarding $2500 for lost housing opportunity and $500 for
inconvenience); HUD v. Jeffre, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending
(Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,020, at 25,298 (Dec. 18, 1991) (awarding $2500 for lost housing
opportunities); HUD v. Holiday Manor Estates Club, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair
Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,016, at 25,232-33 (Nov. 26, 1991) (awarding $500
for lost housing opportunity and $750 for inconvenience), aff’d in part and rev’d. in part, [2A HUD
Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,027, at 25,231 (Mar.
23, 1992). For a more exhaustive list of types and amounts of damage awards, see SCHWEMM, supra
note 12, at App. E.
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (1994). In pattern and practice cases, courts can award civil
penalties. See 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a),(d)(1)(C).
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g)(3).
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except that a respondent pays the penalty to the federal government rather
than to the complainant, and the size of the penalty is based on the number of
times the respondent has been found in violation of the Act.69 The maximum
penalty for a first-time offender is $11,000.70 No limits apply to the
imposition of punitive damage awards.
Equitable and declaratory relief are also available under the Act.71 Typical
relief includes a preliminary order that the seller or landlord not transfer or
rent the property until resolution of the claim, a final judgment ordering the
seller or landlord to transfer or rent the property to the victim of
discrimination, or an order that the seller, landlord, or agent cease all
discriminatory housing practices.72 Other provisions allow the prevailing
party in cases brought directly in court to recover attorneys’ fees and costs;
however, they are not available to the United States.73 The Act also allows
prevailing intervenors to recover attorneys’ fees unless “special
circumstances make the recovery of such fees and costs unjust.”74
E. The Lack of Remedies for Lost Access to Communities
Adjudicators of claims brought under the Act do not adequately
compensate people for the injury they incur when landlords, sellers, or real
estate agents unlawfully deny them access to valuable communities.75
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g)(3).
70. See 24 C.F.R. § 180.671(a)(1) (1999).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g)(3) (granting authority to ALJs); 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1) (granting
authority to judges).
72. See, e.g., Moore v. Townsend, 525 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1975) (affirming district court ruling
ordering defendant home owners to convey their home to plaintiffs). See generally SCHWEMM, supra
note 12, at § 25.3(4)(d). The utility of equitable remedies to individual complainants is questionable.
The Fair Housing Act prohibits courts from issuing equitable relief that would “affect any contract,
sale, encumbrance or lease consummated before” the issuance of the court’s equitable orders. See 42
U.S.C. § 3613(d). In a tight housing market, a landlord who unlawfully denies a unit to an applicant
likely will be able to rent the unit before the complainant can obtain a preliminary injunction.
Similarly, a final judgment ordering a defendant to transfer a dwelling to the complainant is usually
too late; most plaintiffs secure alternative housing long before their cases go to judgment. See
Armstrong, supra note 18, at 930.
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2).
74. 24 C.F.R. 180.705(b) (implementing § 3612 to allow ALJs to award intervenors in HUD
proceedings attorneys’ fees and costs). The right of intervenors to recover attorneys’ fees in “elected”
cases is not explicit; however, all relief, including attorneys’ fees, that is available to plaintiffs who
bypass the HUD procedure and proceed directly to court is available to intervenors in elected cases.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3612(o)(3), 3613(c)(2).
75. See Armstrong, supra note 18, at 923 (noting that compensatory damages do not compensate
for lost access to good schools and neighborhood services). In the discussion accompanying infra
notes 85-90, I identify four cases in which ALJs have acknowledged that communities can have a
value to complainants; however, the ALJs who rendered these decisions clearly were uncertain how to
characterize the complainants’ claims and how to compensate them for their loss.
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Although at first blush damages for lost housing opportunities76 would
appear to redress this injury, ALJs77 typically award lost housing opportunity
damages in only two, limited situations: if the physical attributes of the
alternative housing were inferior to the unit the complainant sought and was
denied; or if the desired unit had a unique value to the complainant that was
not reflected in the price of the unit.78 Adjudicators have awarded damages
based on the physical qualities of alternative housing in cases in which the
complainants had to live in a small and poorly heated trailer,79 and an
apartment with an unfinished bathroom, leaks, and inoperable windows.80
Awards for this type of lost housing opportunity do not capture the loss
experienced by a complainant who was forced to live in an inferior
community. Such awards compensate only those who were forced to live in
inferior dwellings.
Likewise, lost housing opportunity awards, based on the injury
complainants experience when denied housing that had a unique value81 to
them that was not reflected in the price of the housing,82 do not encompass
the loss complainants experience when denied access to a desirable
community. Examples of the former type of loss include the value to an
76. The origin of claims for lost housing opportunities is unclear. The first published ALJ
decision to refer to an injury based on lost housing opportunity was HUD v. Morgan, [2A HUD
Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,008, at 25,139 (July
25, 1991), aff’d in part, rev. in part, 985 F.2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1993). In Morgan, HUD sought
“damages for the opportunity which was lost because the [complainants] were deprived of their
opportunity to purchase the [sellers’] home.” Id. This language suggests that HUD attorneys
introduced the notion of lost housing opportunity claims. See also Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 59, at
26 (“Complainants in several administrative cases have sought damages for what has been styled as
‘lost housing opportunity.’”).
77. Thus far, only ALJs have awarded damages for lost housing opportunities, although one
court has awarded emotional distress damages to a couple who was “forced to remain in less desirable
housing.” Pollitt v. Bramel, 669 F. Supp. 172, 176-77 (S.D. Ohio 1987). In addition, another court has
affirmed an ALJ award for lost housing opportunities. See Banai v. HUD, 102 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th
Cir. 1997).
78. As discussed in supra note 65, one ALJ equates claims for lost housing opportunities with
claims for the loss of rights per se and awards only nominal damages.
79. See HUD v. Welch, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen
Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,125, at 26,070 (Dec. 2, 1996).
80. See HUD v. Burns Trust, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending
(Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,073, at 25,683 (June 17, 1994), reconsidered upon unopposed motion to
remand in [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.)
¶ 25,092, at 25,840 (Jan. 17, 1995).
81. I refer to this category of claims as “unique value” lost housing opportunity claims.
In economic terms, these awards compensate for the “consumer surplus” that would have accrued
to a complainant had he been able to acquire the desired housing. See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE
MICROECONOMICS (1987).
82. See Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 59, at 26. For an ALJ opinion granting this type or award,
see, e.g., HUD v. French, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen
Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,113 (Sept. 12, 1995).
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infirm complainant of living in a one story unit that was convenient to her
physical therapist83 and the loss a complainant incurred when he had to rent
alternative housing that was farther away from the area he covered as a sales
representative.84 A claim for damages based on lost access to a desirable
community falls outside the unique value category of lost housing
opportunity claims because the benefits of living in a community are not
personal to any given complainant.
There are four published opinions by ALJs85 that discuss complainants’
allegations that discrimination forced them to live in neighborhoods with
more crime and inferior schools.86 In one of these decisions, HUD v.
French,87 the ALJ framed the loss as one arising from the unique value of the
dwelling to the complainants. The ALJ held that the value to a mother of
renting an apartment in a safe neighborhood in the best school district was
83. See Banai v. HUD, 102 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 1997).
84. See HUD v. Bangs, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen
Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,040, at 25,409 (Jan. 5, 1993); see also HUD v. Ineichen, [2A HUD Administrative
Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,099, at 25,893 (Apr. 4, 1995)
(discrimination forced family to leave community “where they had lived for many years and where
they had established solid, nurturing relationships with friends, neighbors, schools and other
institutions”); HUD v. Colber, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen
Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,096, at 25,864 (Feb. 9, 1995) (alternative housing was farther from complainant’s
mother’s home); HUD v. Burns Trust, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair
Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,073, at 25,683-84 (June 17, 1994) (eviction caused complainant
with AIDS to lose comfortable, clean, quiet, wheelchair accessible home near caregivers and public
transportation); HUD v. Sams, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending
(Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,069, at 25,651 (Mar. 11, 1994) (lost housing opportunity award based in part
on fact that alternative housing was farther from the family’s church, and the children’s piano lessons),
aff’d, 76 F.3d 375 (4th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision).
85. There are no published court decision awarding damages for the loss experienced by people
who are prevented from moving into desirable communities.
86. See HUD v. French, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen
Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,113, at 25,978 (Sept. 12, 1995) (compared to housing obtained, denied housing was
in an area with a lower crime rate and within the best school district); HUD v. Kogut, [2A HUD
Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,100, at 25,905-06
(Apr. 17, 1995) (emotional distress and lost housing opportunity damages award based, in part, on
location of alternative housing in crime ridden area); HUD v. Sams, [2A HUD Administrative
Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,069, at 25,651 (Mar. 11, 1994) (lost
housing opportunity award based in part on increased crime in the area of the alternative housing);
HUD v. Lashley, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law &
Bus.) ¶ 25,039, at 25,405-07 (Dec. 7, 1992) (damages awarded to high school student who, as a result
of discrimination, had to transfer to a high school that had a “‘bad reputation’ for guns, drugs and
gangs”).
In assessing the “irreparable injury” prong of claims for equitable relief, courts have recognized
that living in desirable communities has some value. See, e.g., Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1185
(N.D. Ohio 1972) (holding that “the loss of being able to escape the never-ending and seemingly
unbreakable cycle of poverty” was one basis for enjoining the defendant municipality from continuing
its practice of refusing to locate low income housing in white neighborhoods).
87. HUD v. French, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen
Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,113 (Sept. 12, 1995).
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“particular and uncommon,” even though there was no evidence that the unit
had a personal value to the mother that exceeded its rental price.88 To the
contrary, the quality schools and safe streets would have benefited any
potential tenant, not just the complainant, and likely were reflected in the
price. The ALJ may have characterized the dwelling as “particular and
uncommon” because the extant notions of what constitutes a lost housing
opportunity have not encompassed claims based on the intrinsic value of a
community.
In the other three decisions, the ALJs mentioned that the discrimination
prevented the complainants from having access to quality schools and safe
neighborhoods, but the ALJs circumvented the dilemma of how to categorize
the complainants’ losses by issuing one award for all of the complainants’
intangible injuries.89 As a result, it is impossible to determine the category of
intangible injuries to which the ALJs attributed the complainants’ claims for
damages based on their lost access to good schools and safe streets. These
four decisions reveal that, in a very small number of cases, ALJs have
recognized that home-seekers incur a compensable injury when landlords,
sellers, and real estate agents deny them access to safe streets and good
schools. These decisions, however, are anomalies.90
The reality is that when discriminatory practices prevent home-seekers
from moving up the residential hierarchy, the fair housing remedies fail to
compensate for their injury. This outcome is contrary to the Supreme Court’s
unequivocal pronouncement that civil rights remedies should provide
complete relief:
[T]he scope of relief under [Title VII] is intended to make the victims
of unlawful discrimination whole, and . . . the attainment of this
objective rests not only upon the elimination of the particular unlawful
. . . practice complained of, but also requires that persons aggrieved by
the consequences and effects of the unlawful . . . practice be, so far as
88. Id. at 25,978.
89. In HUD v. Lashley, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen
Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,039, at 25,048  (Dec. 7, 1992), the ALJ awarded $10,000 for emotional distress,
humiliation, inconvenience and lost housing opportunity, and emphasized that the complainant had to
transfer to a more dangerous school. Id. at 25,407. In HUD v. Sams, [2A HUD Administrative
Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,069 (Mar. 11, 1994), the ALJ’s award
for intangibles of $24,000 included compensation for the emotional distress and lost housing
opportunity experienced by seven complainants based in part on their having to live in an area with
more crime. Id. at 25,651. Lastly, in HUD v. Kogut, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair
Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,100 (Apr. 17, 1995), the ALJ awarded $25,000 for
emotional distress, lost housing opportunity and physical harm to a complainant who had to move to a
crime ridden area. Id. at 25,905-06.
90. Such decisions represent only four of hundreds of published fair housing opinions.
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possible, restored to a position where they would have been were it
not for the unlawful discrimination. 91
F. Summary
High rates of housing discrimination persist. Discrimination can preclude
those who seek to move up the residential hierarchy from improving their
socioeconomic status and that of their children. Fair housing laws and the
cases arising under them have failed to provide an adequate remedy for the
loss these home-seekers experience.
II. THE PROPOSED REMEDY
In the preceding section, I identified a previously overlooked injury
arising from housing discrimination. In this section, I suggest a novel remedy
for this injury. Two hurdles combine to inhibit adjudicators from
compensating complainants for the loss they experience when landlords,
sellers, and real estate agents prevent them from living in desirable
communities. First, existing notions of the injuries that qualify as lost
housing opportunities do not encompass lost access to communities. The
second and more difficult hurdle is determining the value, in monetary terms,
of living in a given community.92
The first hurdle is surmountable. ALJs already recognize that a
complainant has a lost housing opportunity claim if his alternative housing is
inferior. Lost access to community claims parallel inferior housing claims. In
addition, a few ALJs implicitly have recognized that complainants are
entitled to relief when discrimination prevents them from attending good
schools and living in safe neighborhoods. It seems likely that adjudicators93
91. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 7168
(1972)); see also Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965) (holding that courts have a
“duty to render . . . decree[s] which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the
past as well as bar like discrimination in the future”). Although Louisiana v. United States was a
Voting Rights Act case and Albemarle arose under Title VII, courts have relied on both cases when
interpreting Title VIII. See, e.g., Williamsburg Fair Hous. Comm. v. New York City Hous. Auth., 493
F. Supp. 1225, 1250-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
92. See Armstrong, supra note 18, at 923 (noting the difficulty in assessing the value of the
“social and economic benefits of exposure to mainstream lifestyles”); Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 59,
at 26.
93. The Supreme Court has recognized that people can derive intangible benefits from living in a
community. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Insurance Company, 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (extending
standing to white tenants who brought claims that their landlord’s discriminatory practices denied
them the benefit of living in an integrated community); see also Gladstone Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109-16 (1979).
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would be willing to recognize claims for lost access to community under the
lost housing opportunity umbrella.
The second hurdle— approximating the value of living in a desirable
community— can be overcome by using information on housing prices. The
price of a dwelling reflects its physical characteristics and amenities as well
as the quality of the community in which it is located. One can isolate the
“community effect” of the price by comparing the price of the housing a
complainant obtained with the price of the housing he sought in the more
desirable community. The difference in price94 can be used to determine the
value of living in the more desirable community. I refer to this as the
“calculating lost access to community method” or “CLAC method.”95
The use of prices, including housing prices, to infer the value of
intangible attributes has a long tradition in economics.96 A number of
economists have used housing price data to calculate intangibles like the
value of clean air and good schools. One team of researchers analyzed
housing price data in Los Angeles and found that the monthly value of living
in an area with clean air was as high as $128.46.97 Another team of
researchers calculated the value of living in a “good” school district by
looking at housing prices in several Cleveland area communities and
determining how much of the sale price of the housing was attributable to the
94. In essence, the difference in price is a residual that can be attributed to the value of the better
community. The law recognizes the concept of residuals. For example, in the context of employment
discrimination, residual wage differences have been attributed to gender and race discrimination.
A recent article in the Boston Globe provided an illustration of residual housing price differences.
See Doreen Iudica Vigue, A Town House Divided . . . , BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 14, 1998, (Metro), at B1.
Cambridge and Somerville are abutting suburbs of Boston. Cambridge is a trendier community with
better schools. See id. Where the two towns abut, there is a duplex that consists of two townhouses—
one is located in Cambridge, the other in Somerville. See id. The features and design of the two
townhouses are identical, except that the Cambridge unit has off-street parking valued at $15,000-
$20,000. See id. The units went on the market simultaneously in 1998, and the Somerville townhouse
sold for $40,000 less than the Cambridge unit. See id.
95. The CLAC method could be employed in HUD and court proceedings.
96. By using a formula to calculate lost access to community damages, complainants may be
more likely to recover damages and receive larger awards for this type of lost housing opportunity than
the other types, which often yield low awards or fail altogether for lack of proof. See Heifitz & Heinz,
supra note 59, at 25 (noting that most lost housing opportunity claims fail because of inadequate
proof).
Similarly, when the CLAC method leads to larger awards, it may be more likely that they will be
upheld on appeal. Professor Schwemm has observed that appellate courts are particularly likely to
reverse sizeable lower court awards for housing discrimination when the awards are not based on
tangible economic injuries. See Schwemm, supra note 9, at 760. Courts may have greater confidence
in CLAC-generated awards and may thus give them the same deference they give to calculations of
economic losses even though the underlying injuries are intangible.
97. See David S. Brookshire et al., Valuing Public Goods: A Comparison of Survey and Hedonic
Approaches, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 165, 169-73 (1982); David Harrison, Jr. & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Hedonic Housing Prices and the Demand for Clean Air, 5 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 81 (1978).
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quality of the schools.98
A. The Application of the CLAC Method to Claims of Discrimination in
Rental Housing
The first step when using the CLAC method is determining which prices
to compare and how to compare them. In the case of rental housing, one
possible measure is the difference between the rental price of the housing the
complainant sought and the rental price of the housing he obtained, as long as
the dwellings had similar amenities. Take, for example, a complainant who
was denied a $1000 per month apartment in a good inner ring suburb and
moved to or had to remain99 in a $600 per month apartment in a rough city
neighborhood. If the units had the same number and type of rooms, had
equivalent amenities, and were located in similar types of buildings, the $400
rent differential would be the monthly value of living in the better
community.100 The advantage of comparing just these two prices is the
simplicity of the calculation. The disadvantage is that random factors could
influence either or both of the prices and distort the values generated by the
CLAC method.101
An alternative would be to use average prices of comparable units in the
community where the complainant sought to live and the one in which his
alternative housing was located. For example, if the respondent refused to
rent a four bedroom, two bathroom home to the complainant, the
98. See William T. Bogart & Brian A. Cromwell, How Much More is a Good School District
Worth?, 50 NAT’L TAX J. 215 (1997); see also Sandra Black, Do Better Schools Matter?: Parental
Valuation of Elementary Education, Q.J. ECON. 577 (1999) (assessing the value parents place on
homes in good school districts). These researchers looked at communities the borders of which were
different from the school district boundaries. In these communities, children living in the same
neighborhood in the same city attended school in different districts depending on where their homes
fell within the school district lines. Homes located in the better school districts sold for higher prices
than comparable homes in the same municipality but in different school districts. See Bogart &
Cromwell, supra, at 226.
99. The price of the housing the complainant was living in at the time of the discrimination is
relevant only if he remained there after the discriminatory rejection. This is because the purpose of the
CLAC method is to establish a complainant’s loss based on what he was denied versus what he
obtained. To illustrate this point, imagine a complainant who was lawfully evicted from his apartment
in an unsafe neighborhood. If the complainant was denied an apartment in a highly desirable
community, and ultimately moved to a less desirable community that was not as bad as where he had
been living previously, his damages should be the difference between his alternative housing and the
housing he sought, not his original housing and the unit he sought.
100. The complainant would also incur rental savings that arguably should be offset against his
loss. As I discuss later, see infra text accompanying notes 131-42, the law does not contemplate offset
in this situation.
101. For example, if the price of the complainant’s alternative housing was under-market, the
value of the desirable community would be inflated using the CLAC method.
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complainant would compare the average rental price of a four bedroom, two
bath home in the community in which he sought to live with the average
rental price of a comparable home in the community in which his alternative
housing was located. Although there are drawbacks to using averages— for
example, the parties likely would need experts, which would increase
litigation costs, and there would be an increased risk of jury confusion— the
use of averages would eliminate the distortion that could arise when basing
the calculation on the prices of specific units. Courts thus may be more
receptive to calculations based on averages.
Arguably, both measures overstate a complainant’s loss if the
complainant would not or could not use all the services the desirable
community provided. For example, a young able-bodied tenant could not
take advantage of a community transportation program for the elderly. This
argument erroneously assumes that the price of a rental unit reflects the value
of all the benefits of living in a community. This is not the case. Rather,
housing prices reflect the value the marginal person places on living in the
community. For people who would be willing to pay even one dollar more
than the stated rental price to have access to the community, the CLAC
method actually understates their loss.102
The examples used thus far assume that a complainant’s desired housing
had similar attributes to the alternative housing. Calculating damages using
the CLAC method becomes a bit more complicated when the features of the
two housing units are dissimilar. In this situation, the difference between the
price of the complainant’s desired and alternative housing could reflect the
difference in the dwellings’ amenities and not the value of the two
communities. A better comparison might be between the price of the desired
housing and a comparable dwelling in the community in which the
complainant acquired alternative housing. Alternatively, the complainant
could use the averages technique discussed above, in which case the value of
the community would be the difference between the average price of housing
of the type he sought in the desirable community and the average price of
similar housing in the community in which he secured alternative housing.103
102. See Bogart & Cromwell, supra note 98, at 219.
103. If the amenities of the complainant’s alternative housing were also less desirable, he could
bring a claim for lost access to community damages based on having to live in an inferior community
and a claim for lost housing opportunity based on having to live in inferior housing. The reference
point for the former claim would be the communities and for the latter claim, the physical attributes of
the units.
Likewise, if the housing a complainant was denied had a personal value to him that was not
reflected in the price, he could recover these unique lost housing opportunity damages in addition to
his lost access to community damages.
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Once a complainant establishes the monthly value of living in a
community, he needs to project this value over time by multiplying the
monthly value times the appropriate number of months (“the multiplier”).
Depending on the facts in a case, a number of different multipliers might be
appropriate. The most straightforward multiplier would be the number of
months the complainant lived in the less desirable community following the
discriminatory rejection. Respondents might object to this measure unless the
complainant could prove that he attempted to mitigate his damages.104
The various multipliers used to determine awards for the cost of
alternative housing105 are appropriate for calculating lost access to
community damages. For example, ALJs have used the period from the time
the complainant commenced residing in his alternative housing until the time
when he was “no longer obligated to remain in the alternative housing and
[was] free to occupy the denied housing.”106 This measure is usually the
length of the lease for the alternative housing. In the context of a lost access
to community claim, use of this multiplier would assume that the
complainant was bound to remain in the less desirable community only for
the term of the lease for his alternative housing.
A second measure ALJs use in calculating alternative housing costs is the
period from the time the complainant began residing in his alternative
housing until he was “able to occupy comparable housing at a comparable
cost.”107 This measure incorporates a duty to mitigate. A final option used for
assessing alternative housing costs is the number of months between the
discriminatory act and the hearing.108
B. The Application of the CLAC Method to Claims of Discrimination in
Housing Sales
For cases involving discrimination in sales, extrapolating the value of a
community from the price differential is more complicated. The difference
between the selling price of a house a complainant sought and the selling
price of a comparable home he purchased in a less desirable community
would not be a realistic appraisal of the complainant’s loss. If, for example, a
complainant sought to buy a $150,000 house in a good neighborhood and his
alternative, comparable housing cost $100,000, the value of his lost access to
104. See infra Part II.C for a fuller discussion of the duty to mitigate.
105. See supra note 58.
106. Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 59, at 13.
107. Id. at 13-14.
108. Id. at 13.
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the community based on the price differential would be $50,000. This result,
however, would be misleading because the $50,000 is reflected in the equity
of the house, which will be returned to the complainant in cash when he sells
it.109
A better approach would be to use the sale price differentials in a manner
that mimics the use of rental price differences in rental discrimination cases.
This can be done by thinking about the opportunity cost to our hypothetical
person who pays an extra $50,000 to live in a better community. His
opportunity cost is the discounted present value of the interest he could have
earned on the $50,000 if he had invested it in an income-generating
vehicle.110 This lost income reflects the value of living in the better
community. Assuming a five percent interest rate and a five percent discount
rate, the discounted present value of the interest he could have earned on the
$50,000 would be $4,648 over two years, $10,823 over five years, and
$19,304 over ten years.111
The larger the price differential between the housing costs in the
comparison communities, the higher the opportunity cost— and therefore the
value— of living in the better community. This feature of the calculation is
important. The larger the jump a complainant sought to make up the
residential hierarchy, the greater his loss when the respondent’s
discrimination prevented him from moving. Similarly, the longer a
109. In addition, the complainant’s lost access to community injury would be the same whether he
lived in the less desirable community for a day or two years.
110. This calculation assumes no inflation, no change in housing prices, no depreciation, and no
maintenance costs. Relaxing these assumptions would complicate the calculation, but not change it in
any material way. For example, if there was an expectation that a home would appreciate, the
anticipated appreciation would be reflected in the amount the complainant was willing to pay for the
house.
111. Issues like the interest rate, discount rate, and the appropriate time period to use for
calculating the discounted present value would be left to adjudicators based on the facts of each case.
There is no need to make an adjustment for taxes the complainant would have paid because the
market price is net of taxes. In other words, the price adjusts according to the tax liability. As an
illustration, assume the actual value of the house in the desirable community is $152,000, the annual
taxes $2000, and the annual value of the services the community provides $10,000, the price of the
house would be adjusted to $150,000. In one of the few studies of the relationship of taxes to housing
prices, researchers found that housing prices in high tax communities were higher because of the high
value of services they provided. See Bogart & Cromwell, supra note 98, at 227. The researchers
interpreted these results to mean that the housing prices reflected the value of the community services
net of taxes.
All the variations discussed in the previous section on calculating the value of a community when
a complainant is a renter could apply when the complainant is a buyer. Thus, the price differential
could be based on the average market price of comparable housing in the desirable community and the
community in which the complainant obtained housing in lieu of the prices of the actual houses sought
and obtained. Similarly, if the houses sought and obtained were not comparable, the calculation could
be based on the price of the desired housing and a comparable dwelling in the community in which the
complainant’s alternative housing was located.
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complainant expected to stay in the better community, the larger his
damages.
Another possible method for calculating lost access to community
damages would be to establish the value of a community based on the
difference in the size of a complainant’s actual interest payments. As an
illustration, reconsider the previous example using the $50,000 price
differential. The first step would be to calculate the discounted present value
of the interest the complainant actually would have paid on the $50,000. The
second step would be to compound the discounted present value of the
interest; this calculation would account for the opportunity cost that arose
because the complainant would not be able to invest the money that he would
be spending on interest. The total after discounting and compounding would
reflect the value the complainant placed on living in the more desirable
community. This method is problematic, however, because the difference in
interest payments would vary depending on the size of the complainant’s
down payment and his credit history.
An alternative to using house sale prices to calculate lost access to
community damages would be to use data on rental prices; the complainant’s
damages would be based on the difference between the average cost of
renting a house that was comparable to the one he sought to buy and the
average cost of renting a comparable house in the community in which his
alternative housing was located. The problem with this method is that there
may not be enough comparable houses for rent in either or both of the
communities to make reliable comparisons.
Even after determining the monthly value of living in a community, an
adjudicator must still determine the appropriate period of time for which a
complainant is entitled to compensation. The time periods previously
discussed in claims involving discrimination in rental housing may be too
limited in the sales context because of the transaction costs a seller incurs.
For example, limiting a complainant’s damages to the period from the time
of the discrimination until he was able to purchase comparable housing at a
comparable cost in the desirable community does not take into account the
non-reimbursable costs he would incur selling his alternative housing and
buying the housing in the desirable community. His remedy would thus have
to include his transaction costs in addition to the damages generated by the
CLAC method.
C. The Duty to Mitigate
A complainant arguing for a remedy using the CLAC method would have
to demonstrate that he attempted to find alternative housing in the desired
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area after he was rejected. Otherwise, he could chose to live in a less
expensive, less desirable community and then use the CLAC method to
unfairly enhance his damages. One ALJ, in considering a claim for lost
housing opportunity damages, implicitly acknowledged this requirement.
In HUD v. Ineichen,112 the complainants sought rental housing when the
unit in which they were living was sold.113 They attempted to rent an
apartment that was one block from where they were living, but the landlord
rejected them because they had too many children.114 The complainants
ultimately moved from their “neighborhood with valued amenities” to an
apartment that was noisy, infested with roaches and located in an area where
there was drug dealing and other criminal activity.115 They sought damages
based, in part, on the inferior location of their new housing.116 The alternative
apartment cost less than both the complainants’ former apartment and the
apartment they sought to rent.117 The ALJ noted that some of the
complainants’ “discomfort” with their alternative dwelling was attributable to
the fact that it was less expensive.118 He went on to state that “victims of
housing discrimination cannot be compensated for living in less desirable
alternative housing as such.”119
The ALJ observed, and appeared to be motivated by, the fact that the
complainants had not introduced any evidence that they had been unable to
find alternative housing in the neighborhood in which they had been
rejected.120 This suggests that the ALJ would have been more receptive to the
complainants’ claim for lost housing opportunity damages if they had
demonstrated that the respondent’s discrimination precluded them from
living in their former neighborhood. Just the same, the ALJ awarded the
complainants $4000 for emotional distress and lost housing opportunity
without discussing the basis for the lost housing opportunity portion of the
award.121
In another case, HUD v. Wagner,122 the ALJ who decided Ineichen
112. [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.)
¶ 25,099 (Apr. 14, 1995).
113. Id. at 25,889.
114. Id. at 25,888.
115. Id. at 25,889, 25,893.






122. [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.)
¶ 25,032 (June 22, 1992).
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effectively equated the failure to mitigate lost housing opportunity damages
with expressing a preference for the inferior housing. In Wagner, the
complainant acquired alternative housing that was less expensive than, and
inferior to, the housing he had originally sought.123 He remained in the
inferior unit for two years.124 The ALJ implied that because the complainant
had not pursued housing comparable to that which he had been denied, he
revealed his preference to live in a less expensive, alternative dwelling. His
“injury”— the lost amenities— was, therefore, partly the result of his own
exercise of choice, and not solely the consequence of the landlord’s
discriminatory behavior.125
The duty to mitigate is also revealed in damages for a different, but
related, claim in housing discrimination cases. When a complainant brings a
claim to recover the increased cost of alternative housing, he too has a duty to
mitigate.126 To receive compensation for increased rental costs, a
complainant must prove that he made a reasonable effort to obtain housing
comparable to that which he was denied.127 This requirement naturally
extends to claims relying on the CLAC method: if a complainant seeks
damages for lost access to services in a community as a result of a landlord’s,
seller’s, or agent’s discrimination, he can recover damages if he demonstrates
that he sought, but was unable to obtain, comparable housing that would
provide the same community amenities.
The failure to mitigate would not necessarily bar recovery for lost housing
opportunities using the CLAC method. Depending on the facts in a case, an
adjudicator might elect to reduce rather than bar a complainant’s recovery if
he failed to mitigate.128 In both Ineichen and Wagner, the ALJ allowed the
complainants to recover damages for their lost housing opportunities, but
reduced the amount of their awards because of their failure to mitigate.
Complainants might not always have a duty to mitigate their lost access to
community damages. A complainant could argue that it would have been
futile for him to try to mitigate his damages if the discriminatory landlord
owned the only significant apartment complex in the community129 or if the
123. Id. at 25,337-38.
124. Id.
125. Id. The ALJ noted that the complainant could not receive lost housing opportunity damages
as compensation for “living in a less expensive apartment, as such.” Id. at 25,337.
126. SCHWEMM, supra note 12, at § 25.3(2)(b) (1998).
127. Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 59, at 13 (1992).
128. In Title VII cases, the failure to mitigate a back pay award is not an automatic bar to
recovering back pay. See Booker v. Taylor Milk Co., 64 F.3d 860, 867-68 (3d Cir. 1995); but see
Sellers v. Delgado College, 902 F.2d 1189, 1196 (5th Cir.) (failure to mitigate precluded back pay
award).
129. Schwemm, supra note 63, at 112.
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discriminator was a real estate agency that had a monopoly on the listings in
the community.130
D. No Right to Offset a Complainant’s Savings
When a respondent’s discriminatory actions force a complainant to live in
a less expensive community, the complainant typically incurs savings in rent
or interest payments131 that arguably should be offset against any award
based on the complainant’s lost access to community. This offset could
significantly reduce, or potentially moot, a complainant’s lost access to
community damages. Although at first blush it appears that offset should
apply,132 principles governing tort remedies suggest otherwise.
A fundamental principle of tort remedies133 is that offset is permitted only
if the defendant’s bad act caused a benefit to accrue to the same interest for
which the plaintiff seeks compensation.134 Otherwise, a plaintiff would not be
made whole and the defendant would be allowed “to force a benefit [on the
plaintiff] against his will.”135 For the purpose of determining the applicability
of offset to damages using the CLAC method, the question is whether lost
access to community damages fall within the same “interest” as rental or
interest savings. A complainant using the CLAC method alleges damages
based on the intangible benefits he would have derived from living in the
130. See, e.g., Pinchback v. Armistead Homes Corp., 907 F.2d 1447, 1451-52 (4th Cir. 1990)
(applying the futile gesture doctrine from employment discrimination law to hold that a plaintiff could
maintain her housing discrimination suit against a housing development cooperative even though she
had not made an effort to purchase a house. Because the cooperative had a policy of not selling to
black people, it would have been futile for the plaintiff to have made an offer).
131. There could not be any claim that real estate taxes should be offset because the sales prices
used with the CLAC method are net of taxes. See supra note 111.
132. Using conventional microeconomics, the plaintiff’s damages would be determined by the
amount of money required to put him at the utility level he would have enjoyed but for the
discrimination. The amount of money required to do this would depend on the nature of the plaintiff’s
preferences. This economic approach, which effectively allows for limited offset, differs in important
and subtle ways from the legal approach to calculating damages. For reasons discussed infra, the law
allows a plaintiff to recover the full damages generated by the CLAC method regardless of any benefit
the plaintiff may have derived from not being able to obtain the housing of his choice, i.e. the law will
allow full recovery without offset.
133. In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974), the Supreme Court implicitly held that tort
principles govern Fair Housing Act remedies; cf. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979). For an example of the application of
this principle, see illus. 6:
A tortuously imprisons B for two weeks. In an action brought by B for false imprisonment in
which damages are claimed for pain, humiliation and physical harm, A is not entitled to mitigate
damages by showing that at the end of the imprisonment B obtained large sums from newspapers
for writing an account of the imprisonment.
135. See id. at cmt. f.
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desirable community. This injury is not a pecuniary loss.136 In contrast, any
claim for offset is pecuniary. Such a claim asserts that the respondent’s bad
act saved the complainant money and the respondent is, therefore, entitled to
an offset of the complainant’s savings.137 Thus, if a complainant sought
damages for lost access to a desirable community, his claim for damages and
any demand by the respondent for offset would relate to separate and distinct
interests 138 and the respondent would not be entitled to offset.139
ALJs have had the opportunity to consider whether offset should apply
when a respondent’s discriminatory acts enabled a complainant to pay less in
rent than he would have paid but for the discrimination. This issue arises
when complainants bring claims for lost housing opportunities or
inconvenience even when their alternative housing cost less than the housing
they were unlawfully denied. For example, in Banai v. HUD,140 the
complainants lived with relatives after being illegally denied an apartment.141
Neither the ALJ nor the reviewing court that affirmed the ALJ’s award for
lost housing opportunity damages addressed offsetting the complainants’
award by any rental savings they incurred when they were living with their
136. The claim is akin to recognized lost housing opportunity claims, which have uniformly been
considered claims for intangible injuries. See Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 59, at 17.
137. One might argue that the plaintiff’s reliance on rental prices to calculate his loss converts his
claim to a pecuniary loss; however, his reliance on the rental prices is simply operational.
138. If the complainant’s underlying claim were pecuniary, the landlord might have a valid claim
for offset. This situation arose in Allen v. Gifford, 368 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1973). In Allen, a black
couple sought to purchase a home from a developer, who refused to consummate the sale. Id. at 318-
19. The couple was ultimately able to purchase the home, but lived for several months in a hotel. Id. at
319. In a 42 U.S.C. § 1982 claim against the developer, they claimed as damages the cost of living in
the hotel. Id. at 321. The court noted that during the period the plaintiffs were living in the hotel, they
did not have to make the mortgage payments they would have made had the developer initially
allowed them to purchase the house. Id. The court went on the say that the mortgage payments “might
be considered an offset” against the plaintiffs’ damages claim. Id.
It is noteworthy that in the context of Title VII, in which claims for back pay are restitutionary,
one court went so far as to prohibit a defendant from offsetting a plaintiff’s pecuniary savings against
her pecuniary loss. In EEOC v. Service News Co., 898 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1990), the court refused to
offset the plaintiff’s savings in child care against her back pay award. Id. at 964. Both the back pay
award and the savings in child care were pecuniary in nature, but the court held that the defendant
“should not escape liability for back pay . . . merely because [the plaintiff] would have used some of
her paycheck to pay . . . child care.” Id.
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 cmt. b (1979) (“Damages resulting from an
invasion of one interest are not diminished by showing that another interest has been benefited.”); see
also Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243, 248-49 (Wis. 1990) (relying on the Restatement in a
wrongful birth case to hold that the defendant could not offset the non-financial benefits the child
would provide the parents against the parents’ claim for expenses to raise the child). For a fuller
discussion of how courts have applied the restatement principles to wrongful birth cases, see Mark
Strasser, Misconceptions and Wrongful Births: A Call for a Principled Jurisprudence, 31 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 161, 189 (1999).
140. 102 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir 1997).
141. Id. at 1205.
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relatives. In fact, there are no cases in which respondents have sought or
ALJs have discussed offsetting a complainant’s rental savings.142
Similarly, when courts and ALJs have considered the reverse situation—
where complainants’ alternative housing cost more and had better amenities
than the housing they were unlawfully denied— they have allowed the
complainants to recover the increased cost of their alternative housing
without offsetting the value of the added amenities.143 In this situation,
respondents have argued that complainants are unjustly enriched if they
recover damages for their increased housing costs because they benefit from
the amenities the more desirable housing offers them.144 Adjudicators have
applied the principle of “cover” from contract law145 to reject this defense. In
the context of housing discrimination, cover allows complainants who have
engaged in reasonable searches for substitute housing to recover their
increased rental costs without taking into account any benefits that accrued to
them from living in housing with greater amenities.146 The rationale is that
the respondents forced the complainants to increase their allocation of
monetary resources for housing, which precluded them from spending
money on other goods and services.147
142. If respondents are entitled to offset rental savings, one would expect that ALJs would be
reducing complainants’ awards by their rental savings. See HUD v. Kelly, [2A HUD Administrative
Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,034, at 25,363 (Aug. 26, 1992), aff’d
in part and rev’d in part, 3 F.3d 951 (6th Cir. 1993), modified on remand by [2A HUD Administrative
Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,090 (Dec. 1, 1994) (awarding lost
housing opportunity damages based in part on the inferior amenities at the complainant’s alternative
housing without recognizing any rental savings that may have accrued to the complainant when she
continued to live with her parents after illegally being rejected for a rental unit), aff’d in part and rev’d
in part, 97 F.3d 118 (6th Cir. 1996); HUD v. Leiner, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair
Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,021, at 25,268-69 (Jan. 3, 1992) (allowing the
complainant to recover as “inconvenience” damages the increased commuting expenses she incurred
when she moved in with her great-grandmother after illegally being denied housing, and not discussing
any rental savings that the complainant presumably incurred as a result of living with her great-
grandmother); HUD v. Rollhaus, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending
(Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,019, at 25,250 (Dec. 9, 1991) (alternative housing increased commuting
distance for which ALJ awarded recovery based on federal mileage rate; however ALJ did not
consider complainant’s savings in rent while she lived with her parents between time she was denied
apartment and secured alternative housing).
143. See Morgan v. HUD, 985 F.2d 1451, 1458 (10th Cir. 1993); Miller v. Apartments and Homes
of N.J., Inc., 646 F.2d 101, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1981); HUD v. French, [2A HUD Administrative
Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,113, at 25,975 (Sept. 12, 1995).
144. See Miller, 646 F.2d at 111-12 (rejecting an argument that the defendants should not be liable
for the plaintiffs’ increased housing costs because the plaintiffs “received fair economic value” in the
form of greater amenities for the rent they paid).
145. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-712 (1989).
146. See cases cited supra, note 143.
147. See Miller, 646 F.2d at 112. This rationale parallels the Restatement principles governing the
applicability of offset. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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The reasoning motivating the application of cover when a complainant’s
alternative housing costs more applies equally to situations in which a
complainant is forced to buy less than he desires and receives a financial
benefit as a result.148 In both situations, the respondent has taken away the
complainant’s power to choose where he lives149 and how he spends his
money. Regardless of whether the respondent’s bad acts generated
unexpected savings in living expenses or better living quarters for the
complainant, as long as the complainant sought comparable housing, the
respondent should not receive credit for benefits that the complainant neither
sought nor desired.150
It is true that prohibiting offset may result in a complainant having extra
cash in his pocket when a respondent prevents him from obtaining housing in
a more expensive community; however, Congress has countenanced the
unjust enrichment of victims of discrimination in pursuit of the goals of the
Fair Housing Act. The clearest example of this is the enhanced punitive
damages provisions in the 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act.151
Punitive damages indisputedly provide a windfall to plaintiffs, but Congress
deemed them necessary to stem the tide of housing discrimination.152
E. The Validity of Using Formulas to Place a Value on Intangible Injuries
The CLAC method uses housing prices to generate the value of a
complainant’s intangible lost access to a desirable community. Although
courts have been reluctant to allow plaintiffs to use formulas to give
numerical values to their intangible injuries, the CLAC method may be more
reliable than other efforts to scientifically calculate intangible losses.
The most well-known attempts to calculate intangible injuries
mathematically use willingness-to-pay studies to determine the monetary
148. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 cmt. f (1977).
149. The loss of choice alone is not a compensable injury. See Baumgardner v. HUD, 960 F.2d
572, 581-83 (6th Cir. 1992) (setting aside an ALJ award of $2500 for civil rights injury that the trial
court had based in part on the complainant’s loss of the right to choose where to live).
150. This is true even if a complainant elects to live in a home with greater amenities, but in a less
desirable neighborhood. An example would be a complainant who attempted to rent a $1500 per
month studio apartment in Greenwich Village and, after being unlawfully rejected for the unit, rented a
four bedroom house in Queens for the same price. The respondent’s bad acts caused the complainant
to incur unexpected and unwanted savings; the manner in which the complainant chose to spend his
increased savings is irrelevant to his claim for lost access to community damages as long as he
attempted to mitigate his loss by continuing to look for housing in Greenwich Village.
151. Pub. L. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988).
152. See Armstrong, supra note 18, at 916-18 (arguing that class-based equitable remedies under
the Fair Housing Act would be consistent with Congress’s willingness to make plaintiffs more than
whole as reflected in the 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act).
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value of a good quality of life in personal injury cases153 and to establish the
amount a defendant should pay for damage she caused to natural
resources.154 Critics have declared both methods suspect because they rely on
“hypothetical” data to determine damages. In the personal injury context,
economists rely on data estimating how much consumers will pay to avoid
risk of harm to infer the value that individuals place on a good quality of
life.155 Plaintiffs hope that by establishing the monetary value of their losses
through economic calculations, they can increase the size of their awards.
Trial courts generally have excluded expert testimony based on willingness-
to-pay studies in personal injury cases because there is no consensus among
economists in support of this method for quantifying the value of enjoyment
of life, and because the data reflects lay opinions and therefore is not
“expert.”156
153. Similar attempts have been made in the employment setting. Plaintiffs have relied on experts
to calculate the diminution in the quality of their lives as a result of the defendants’ discrimination.
Dona S. Kahn & Bernard R. Siskin, Litigating Employment Discrimination Cases 1997, in LITIGATING
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 377, at 423 (1997).
154. See, e.g., Brian R. Binger et al., The Use of Contingent Valuation Methodology in Natural
Resource Damage Assessments: Legal Fact and Economic Fiction, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1029 (1995).
155. One economist, Stanley Smith, uses data on how much people are willing to pay for safety
devices, compensating wage differentials for workers in dangerous jobs, and government cost-benefit
studies related to safety, to determine the value of plaintiffs’ lost quality of life. See Mercado v.
Ahmed, 756 F. Supp. 1097 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff’d, 974 F.2d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 1992). Smith refers to
the plaintiff’s loss as a hedonic injury. This concept refers to the notion that the price of a good should
reflect the utility a consumer should receive from all dimensions of the good. For example, if two
identical apartments rent for $1000 and $1500, respectively, the latter apartment should have public
services and other amenities that have a value of $500 per month. See generally WILLIAM T. BOGART,
THE ECONOMICS OF CITIES AND SUBURBS 279-84 (1998).
For other cases in which parties attempted to introduce testimony by Dr. Smith, see Sherrod v.
Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985), rev’d, 856 F.2d 195 (1988) (en banc); Fetzer v. Wood, 569
N.E. 2d 1237 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
For comprehensive discussions of the use of “willingness to pay” evidence, see Erin O’Hara,
Note, Hedonic Damages for Wrongful Death: Are Tortfeasors Getting Away with Murder?, 78 GEO.
L.J. 1687, 1697-1706 (1990); Tina M. Tabacchi, Note, Hedonic Damages: A New Trend in
Compensation?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 331, 339-40 (1991).
156. See, e.g., Mercado, 756 F. Supp. at 1103. The Seventh Circuit’s decision affirming the trial
court’s exclusion of Smith’s testimony in Mercado includes a rich discussion of how Smith uses
willingness-to-pay data and the criticisms of his methods. See Mercado v. Ahmed, 974 F.2d 863, 869-
71 (7th Cir. 1992). Other courts have rejected numerical valuations of hedonic damages because: (1)
generalized quality of life valuations are irrelevant to the loss experienced by a particular plaintiff; (2)
calculations of hedonic damages are speculative and unreliable; and (3) loss of quality of life damages
are contemplated in awards for pain and suffering. Economists’ valuations of life differ by up to eight
million dollars. See Reuben E. Slesinger, The Demise of Hedonic Damages Claims in Tort Litigation,
6 J. LEGAL ECON., Fall 1996, at 17, 26 app. 1.
Critics of the use of mathematical calculations of hedonic damages to establish lost quality of life
predict that, if legitimized, claims based on willingness-to-pay studies would consume between 10 and
15 percent of the gross national product. See Kahn & Sisken, supra note 153, at 425 (citing numerous
challenges to Smith’s methodology).
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Similar criticisms have arisen when government agencies have used
survey data to assess the cost of damage to natural resources. The
government uses willingness-to-pay surveys, querying how much people
would be willing to pay to protect wildlife and natural areas, or to clean up
toxic sites,157 to place a monetary value on damage to the environment.
Critics argue that damage assessments using this method, known as the
Contingent Valuation Method, are unreliable because they are based on
hypothetical answers to hypothetical questions and because the people
answering the surveys lack sufficient information to make informed
estimates of the amount they would be willing to pay to preserve the
environment.158
The CLAC method should not fall prey to the criticisms that have plagued
the use of willingness-to-pay studies. The CLAC method relies on actual
prices and real transactions, not artificial or hypothetical transactions
concocted for assessing damages. Furthermore, as discussed previously,
economists have recognized that housing prices do reflect the value of
intangible benefits of living in a community.159
F. Summary
The CLAC method, by measuring a community’s effect on housing
prices, provides a tool for assessing the loss a home-seeker experiences when
denied access to a desirable community. Although complex fact situations
may make application of the method complicated at times, there are ways to
address the complexities without compromising the applicability or the
validity of the method.
157. See Binger et al., supra note 154, at 1032. For an application of Contingent Valuation
Methodology (CVM), see General Electric Co. v. Department Of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767, 772-74
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
158. The use of willingness-to-pay studies has been more widely accepted in assessing
environmental damage than personal injuries because Congress gave governmental agencies a broad
mandate to find the best available method for assessing environmental damage, and CVM is the best
method available. See David S. Brookshire & Michael McKee, Is the Glass Half Empty, Is the Glass
Half Full? Compensable Damages and the Contingent Valuation Method, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 51,
70 (1994).
For another critique of the Contingent Valuation Method, see Jeffrey C. Dobbins, The Pain and
Suffering of Environmental Loss: Using Contingent Valuation to Estimate Nonuse Damages, 43 DUKE
L.J. 879 (1994); but see Brookshire et al., supra note 97, at 165 (after testing Contingent Valuation
Method against hedonic price analysis, determining that, if anything, the Contingent Valuation Method
understates the damage).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
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III. ENFORCEMENT OF THE FAIR HOUSING LAWS AND THE CLAC METHOD
FOR CALCULATING DAMAGES
In Parts I and II of this article, I focused on recognizing a remedy for an
overlooked and important injury that victims of discrimination experience. A
full assessment of this remedy requires consideration of how it will interact
with existing enforcement of the fair housing laws. In the following section, I
discuss how the CLAC method affects sellers’, agents’, and landlords’
decisions to discriminate. I then discuss how the method could influence the
decisions of discrimination victims to file claims. In the concluding section, I
consider whether the CLAC method could lead to excessive deterrence and
the relative merit of the CLAC method versus punitive sanctions.
A. Incentives for Landlords, Agents, and Sellers
The fair housing laws are designed to compensate victims of
discrimination and deter potential discriminators by creating incentives for
victims of discrimination to bring claims and obtain relief.160 This
enforcement system is based on the assumption that sellers, landlords, and
agents get a private benefit161 from discriminating. Damage awards are
intended to offset these private benefits.
A number of factors influence landlords’, sellers’, and real estate agents’
decisions to discriminate. Some discriminate simply because they are
bigoted.162 Others fear that property values will decline if members of
protected groups, particularly people of color, move into their
communities.163
Landlords may be more inclined than sellers to discriminate because they
160. See Armstrong, supra note 18, at 919 (noting that the Fair Housing Act, by “relying on
individual action[,] allows persons who oppose the law to disobey or disregard it until another
individual acts to stop them”).
161. Those agents and sellers who unconsciously discriminate do not engage in this type of cost-
benefit analysis but they still may derive financial benefits from their unconscious discrimination.
162. See, e.g., HUD v. Leiner, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending
(Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,021, at 25,262 (Jan. 3, 1992) (rental agent who was the wife of the landlord,
and who rejected a black woman applicant, stated to HUD investigator that “[t]hese people do not pay
their rent . . . . [T]hey don’t clean their apartments, they leave it like a pigsty. . . You put five blacks or
Hispanics in an apartment and you have a pigsty”).
163. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note *, at 94. Landlords and agents are not the only people
concerned about property values. Sellers’ neighbors may have the same concerns and put pressure on
the sellers not to sell to people of color. Sellers who own parcels in the community in addition to the
one they are selling may also discriminate because they perceive it is necessary to maintain property
values. See, e.g., Allen v. Gifford, 368 F. Supp. 317, 320 (E.D. Va. 1973) (developer refused to sell lot
to black family because he thought his investment would lose value if the family moved into the area).
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have ongoing relationships with their tenants and an ongoing interest in their
property. They may worry that existing tenants will move out or that it will
be hard to attract new tenants if they rent to the “wrong” people.164 Landlords
who are motivated by fears and stereotypes may believe that if they rent to
families with children, the children will damage their property165 or bother
other tenants.166 Others may refuse to rent to single mothers167 because they
worry that the women will have “strange” men around, that they won’t pay
the rent, or that their single status reflects weak morals. 168
Landlords can even be well-intentioned discriminators. In one case,169 a
landlord violated the fair housing laws by refusing to rent an apartment to a
family with young children because the unit was in a building next to a
parking lot that was used by large trucks.170 Some state laws actually give
landlords an incentive to discriminate. For example, landlords with buildings
in states that require them to remove lead paint from rental units in which a
young child lives or will live171 have an incentive to discriminate against
families with children.172
164. See, e.g., Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380, 383 (10th Cir. 1973) (landlord refused to
rent apartment to a black applicant citing “problems arising with other renters if he permitted any
[black people] to move into the area”). See also HACKER, supra note 24, at 38 (chronicling that for
whites, the presence of African-americans in the neighborhood gives rise to concerns about crime and
interracial dating).
165. See, e.g., HUD v. Sams, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending
(Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,069, at 25,647 (Mar. 11, 1994) (landlord refused to rent to a large family
because of previous damage to the house).
166. See HUD v. French, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen
Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,113, at 25,969-70 (Sept. 12, 1995) (landlord refused to rent upstairs apartment to a
woman with a teenage daughter because “teenagers are loud and noisy and would disturb the
downstairs tenants”); see also Gonzalez v. Rakkas, No. 93 CV 3229 (JS), 1995 WL 451034, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. July 25, 1995) (landlord rejected Honduran applicant for apartment on grounds that
“Spanish people . . . like to have loud music”).
167. Men also face discrimination. See, e.g., Baumgardner v. HUD, 960 F.2d 572, 574 (landlord
refused to rent to several men on the grounds that men are “messy and unclean”).
168. See, e.g., Walker v. Crigler, 976 F.2d 900, 902 (4th Cir. 1992) (rejecting applicant who was a
single mother because “she had experienced problems with the boyfriends of single women in the
past”).
169. Chapman v. Portfilio, (MCAD Docket No. 87-SPR-0109).
170. See also HUD v. French, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending
(Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,113, at 25,971 (Sept. 12, 1995) (landlord unlawfully rejected applicant with
child on the grounds that it was dangerous for young children to live in his second floor unit).
171. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111 § 197 (1996)(with some exceptions, requiring landlords
to remove or cover any paint, plaster or soil that contains dangerous levels of lead paint from any
premises inhabited by children under six years old).
172. See, e.g., HUD v. DiBari, HUDALJ 01-90-0511-1, at 3-4 (visited Mar. 7, 2000)
<http://www.hud.gov/alj/pdf/dibari.pdf>  (landlord refused to rent apartment to families with children
because he believed the unit contained lead paint); see also Jeff Kramer, Family Alleges Bias on Lead
Paint, BOSTON GLOBE June 10, 1995, at 26 (chronicling the experience of a family with a baby who
was unable to find housing in the Boston area because of the de-leading laws).
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From the perspective of a real estate agent, complying with a landlord’s
or seller’s discriminatory request may be in her financial interest.173 An agent
who refuses to accept a listing because a landlord or seller has expressed
discriminatory preferences loses a potential commission.174 Rental
commissions can be as high as several thousand dollars for a single
apartment. Sales commissions are even larger. An agent’s potential lost
revenue is not necessarily limited to the loss of an isolated commission. If
she refuses to discriminate on behalf of a landlord or seller who owns
multiple units, the agent may be forsaking a regular and significant source of
revenue.175 A profit-maximizing agent could sacrifice many thousands of
dollars in commissions if she refuses to discriminate.176
Agents sometimes discriminate in the absence of an explicit request from
a landlord or seller. For example, agents working in a white community may
believe that they will alienate customers or other brokers if they rent or sell to
people of color.177
Even in states that do not require de-leading, landlords who own units that contain lead paint can
be liable if children living in their units ingest the paint and are poisoned, which is an added reason for
landlords to reject applicants with children.
173. See John Yinger, Measuring Racial Discrimination with Fair Housing Audits: Caught in the
Act, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 881, 892 (1986) (finding that real estate agencies discriminate because they
want to keep their customers— landlords and sellers— happy).
Even though it may be financially advantageous for agencies to discriminate, there are some
agencies that actively participate in enforcing the law. See, e.g., Banai v. HUD, 102 F.3d 1203, 1205
(11th Cir. 1997) (real estate agent, upon learning that a landlord was rejecting an applicant on the basis
of his race, informed the applicant of the landlord’s unlawful rejection and terminated the listing
agreement with the landlord); HUD v. DiBari, HUDALJ 01-90-0511-1, at 3-4 (visited Mar. 7, 2000)
<http://www.hud.gov/alj/pdf/dibari.pdf> (real estate agency refused to list landlord’s apartment after
the landlord rejected couple because wife was pregnant).
174. See, e.g., HUD v. Pfaff, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending
(Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,085, at 25,777 (Oct. 27, 1994) (the rental agent told the landlord that she
would not honor his refusal to rent to a family with five children, and the landlord then tore up his
contract with the agency), rev’d on other grounds, 88 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 1996).
175. See YINGER, supra note 7, at 166.
176. The benefit of discriminating actually rises in response to a decline in the willingness of other
agencies to discriminate. If all but one agency in a given locality refuses to honor landlords’ discriminatory
preferences, the discriminating agency will capture more listings than all the other agencies. To discourage
agencies from discriminating, adjudicators should impose damage awards that exceed the benefit of
discriminating that accrues to one agency when all other agencies refuse to discriminate.
177. YINGER, supra note 7, at 163-64, 184 (concluding that “many . . . agents tend to protect their
current and potential business with prejudiced whites”). See also HACKER, supra note 24, at 35-36
(noting that most whites are unwilling to live in communities in which half the residents are of color);
Harriet B. Newburger, Discrimination by a Profit-Maximizing Real Estate Broker in Response to
White Prejudice, 26 J. URB. ECON. 1 (1989) (modeling real estate brokers’ incentives to discriminate).
Agents may also perceive that discriminating will save them time. If, for example, an agent
suspects that a seller will not sell to people of color, she will not waste her time showing the house to
applicants of color. As the former deputy general counsel of the National Association of Realtors,
Robert Butters, has written, agents’ “results-based compensation system encourages agents to
maximize the number of successful transactions they can arrange in a given period of time.” Robert D.
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The cost to landlords, sellers, and agents of discriminating is the
possibility of having to defend a housing discrimination claim and pay
damages.178 Although it is difficult to obtain an accurate appraisal of typical
damages awarded in fair housing cases,179 the consensus is that housing
discrimination claims are difficult to win180 and do not generate large
awards.181 The majority of complainants file their claims with HUD182 where
Butters, The Real Estate Industry’s View of Audit Results: Comments, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE 153, 155 (Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1992).
178. Being found in violation of the law is not the only risk a seller or landlord assumes when she
discriminates. A landlord risks a loss in revenue if her unit remains vacant. A seller risks a financial
loss if her house does not sell immediately, or sells at a lower price. The magnitude of these risks
depends on how tight the market is for residential real estate and whether prices have adjusted to
changes in supply and demand. See Kushner, supra note 5, at 1056.
179. Some studies include judgments but not settlements, and others include trial outcomes, but
not results from hearings before ALJs. Settlement data is particularly difficult to obtain because
settlements between private parties are often confidential. The best source of data on outcomes is from
agencies that have reporting requirements; however, this data excludes cases heard in court and may
exclude confidential settlements between intervenors and respondents. A further problem is that no
studies incorporate injunctive relief in calculating average awards.
180. See Selmi, supra note 46, at 1452 n.206 (citing Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and
Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1578 (1989)).
181. There have been a handful of housing discrimination cases in which the judgments were
substantial. See, e.g., Timus v. Davis, Inc., No. 91 Civ. 0882 (D.D.C. 1992) (awarding victim of
familial status housing discrimination damages of $2.4 million dollars); Darby v. Heather Ridge, 827
F. Supp. 1296 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (awarding $450,000 to plaintiffs who brought claim of race
discrimination under the Fair Housing Act). The opinion of one authority on housing discrimination is
that cases with large awards are aberrations and unlikely to be the reference points for sellers,
landlords, or agents who are deciding whether to discriminate. See Kushner, supra note 5, at 1070. But
see SCHWEMM, supra note 12, at § 25.3(2)(c).
Damage awards are low because most complainants do not incur significant actual damages, and
emotional distress damages, which form the bulk of most awards, are rarely meaningful. See F. Willis
Caruso et al. Discrimination in Rental Housing, ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION (1998); Robert G.  Schwemm, Private Enforcement and the Fair Housing Act, 6 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 375, 380 (1988).
There are a number of possible explanations for low emotional distress awards. It may be that
fact-finders feel that housing discrimination does not cause appreciable distress. See, e.g., Portee v.
Hastava, 853 F. Supp. 597, 615 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 104 F.3d 349 (2nd Cir. 1996) (vacating child’s
compensatory award on the grounds that a child’s “sadness at not getting a basketball hoop, a pool, or
his own room [was] touching, but [was] inadequate to support an award of more than nominal
damages”); Darby v. Heather Ridge, 827 F. Supp. 1296, 1300 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (reducing $187,160
emotional distress award to $37,160 because the only evidence of distress was the plaintiffs’ testimony
that they experienced sadness and a loss of self-esteem and that they did not enjoy being with other
people). Adjudicators may be particularly reluctant to award emotional distress damages to
complainants who immediately found alternative housing.
Another explanation for low emotional distress awards is that victims of housing discrimination
are unlikely to have impartial witnesses to their distress. See Larry R. Rogers & Kelly N. Kalus, From
One Dollar to $2.4 Million: Narrowing the Spectrum of Damage Awards in Fair Housing Cases
through Basic Tort Litigation Tactics, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 29, 34 (1992) (recommending that
plaintiffs present expert and other witnesses to maximize emotional distress damages). The search for
housing is private and usually does not involve anyone other than roommates and family members. In
contrast, a plaintiff with a physical injury is more likely to have disinterested witnesses who can testify
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most claims are resolved through conciliation or are administratively
closed.183 Of the claims that were conciliated in 1991, the median settlement
was $600. Comparable figures for 1992 and 1993 were $750 and $775,
respectively.184 1987 data on claims that HUD referred to equivalent state
agencies revealed average awards of $135.41 per complainant.185
to his pain and suffering. Adjudicators may be disinclined to award significant emotional distress
damages when a complainant’s evidence of distress comes solely from interested parties. See Teresa
Coleman-Hunter & Gary L. Fischer, Fair Housing Testing— Uncovering Discriminatory Practices, 28
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1127, 1133 (1995) (taking the position that adjudicators may give greater
credibility to tester’s testimony than the testimony of the actual victims because they are dispassionate
observers); Shanna L. Smith, The National Fair Housing Alliance at Work, in RESIDENTIAL
APARTHEID: THE AMERICAN LEGACY 237, 249 (Robert D. Bullard et al. eds., 1994) (criticizing HUD
and Department of Justice attorneys for failing to refer victims of housing discrimination to
psychologists who, by determining the nature and extent of the of victims emotional distress, could
help articulate their injuries); see also Larry Heinrich, The Mental Anguish and Humiliation Suffered
by Victims of Housing Discrimination, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 39 (1992) (documenting methods for
proving emotional distress damages in fair housing cases).
In the absence of sufficient proof that the housing discrimination caused a complainant’s distress,
adjudicators may attribute the complainants’ distress to factors other than the discrimination. See
Schwemm, supra note 12, at § 25.3(2)(c) (noting that proof of a plaintiff’s intangible injuries is “often
sketchy”); Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 59, at 21.
Another factor that may contribute to low awards is that most respondents are small real estate
firms, local landlords, or home-owners. Adjudicators tend to reserve large awards for intangible
injuries for large corporations. Schwemm, supra, at 380-81.
Whatever the cause for low awards in fair housing discrimination cases, it is unlikely that
adjudicators will increase the size of awards on their own. This is because ALJs and judges consider
and rely upon awards in other cases in determining how much they will award in the cases they are
deciding. See Allen, supra note 6, at 352 (arguing that “ALJ’s [sic] slavish adherence to their own
precedents inevitably guarantees modest awards”); Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 59, at 18-19. For
examples of decisions in which adjudicators have adhered to the range of awards in previous cases,
see, e.g., Hamilton v. Svatik, 779 F.2d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 1985) (reviewing other cases to determine
whether $12,000 jury award for intangible injuries “shocked the conscience”); Phillips v. Hunter Trails
Community Ass’n, 685 F.2d 184, 190-91 (7th Cir. 1982) (reducing emotional distress awards of
$25,000 for each plaintiff to $10,000 on the grounds that the awards were more than twice the amount
any previous plaintiffs had recovered for intangible injuries in a housing discrimination case); Portee,
853 F. Supp. at 612-15 & n.9 (reviewing numerous housing discrimination and other civil rights cases
in deciding to set aside a housing discrimination award of $280,000 on the grounds that it “shocked the
judicial conscience”); Hobson v. George Humphreys, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 344, 353 (W.D. Tenn. 1982)
(awarding $10,000 compensatory award after considering comparable awards in other fair housing
cases); Young v. Parkland Village, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 67, 72 (D. Md. 1978) (deciding emotional
distress award by picking an amount that fell within the mid-range of other awards). But see
SCHWEMM, supra note 12, at § 25.3(2)(c) (arguing that, in fact, damages in housing discrimination
cases are on the rise and predicting that the trend will continue).
182. See SCHWEMM, supra note 12, at § 24.2 (documenting that the majority of filings were with
HUD before the 1988 amendments); Selmi, supra note 46, at 1408 & tbl. 2 (documenting this
phenomenon following the passage of the 1988 amendments).
183. Of the cases HUD processed in 1991, almost half were administratively closed and 33%
settled through conciliation. See Schwemm, supra note 9, at 768 (citing UNITED STATES DEP’T OF
HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING 1991: A REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO
SECTION 808(E)(2) OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 7 (1993)).
184. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 14, at 37.
185. Kushner, supra note 6, at 1099-1100 (noting that awards rendered by state and local agencies
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The few complainants who remove their claims to court or proceed before
ALJs receive larger, although still not substantial, awards.186 The U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights found that the average187 ALJ award for race-
based housing discrimination in 1993 was $39,214 and the average court
award was $28,378.188 The same study found that the average ALJ award for
familial status-based housing discrimination in 1993 was $7075.189 The
average court award for familial status cases was $3776.190 DOJ data,
aggregating settlements and verdicts in cases in which the DOJ represented
the complainants as a result of one or both of the parties electing judicial
determination, revealed median awards of $9500 in 1996, and $7500 in
1995.191 Other data on outcomes at trial found that the median trial verdict
from 1992 to 1995 was $41,829 for housing discrimination claims brought
by the private bar and $25,500 for claims in which the plaintiffs were
represented by Department of Justice attorneys.192
It is important to note that these studies use the aggregate amount of
awards, and, as a result, inflate the damages any one respondent would
expect to pay.193 It is not unusual for a housing discrimination case to have
several complainants and several respondents. By using the total amount
awarded in each case, the studies reflect the median and mean awards per-
case, not median and mean amounts per-complainant or per-respondent.
For real estate agencies that have “defense costs”194 or indemnity
have been described as “an insult to the victim and a joke to the real estate industry”) (citing
Residential Segregation Stifling Black Advancement, Professor Testifies, 15 [Current Developments]
Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 695 (1988)).
186. In 1991, only 3% of all claims filed with HUD proceeded to a hearing or trial. Of this 3%,
63% were heard in court and the remainder were heard by ALJs. See Schwemm, supra note 9, at 768-
69 (citing UNITED STATES DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING 1991: A
REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 808(E)(2) OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 7, 12 (1993)).
187. Because of the asymmetrical distribution in housing discrimination awards, the calculation of
means, rather than medians, in this study likely resulted in an overstatement of the amount of typical
awards. See Selmi, supra note 46, at 1419-20 & n.74 (noting that the standard deviation was over two
million dollars in one calculation of the mean award for certain classes of housing discrimination
cases).
188. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 14, at 62-63.
189. See id. at 63.
190. See id.; see also Allen, supra note 6, at 342-43 (noting that familial status cases in particular
have generated modest awards and providing explanations for lower awards in familial status cases).
191. See Selmi, supra note 46, at 1420 n.76.
192. See id. at 1419 tbl. 4. To the extent data on trial awards includes attorneys’ fees, the amount
plaintiffs actually receive is less than these studies suggest. See infra text accompanying notes 199-
200. This is less true in administrative proceedings, where complainants typically are not represented
by counsel.
193. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 14, at 62.
194. Defense costs insurance pays the cost of defense up until the time of judgment. See Ellen S.
Pryor, The Stories We Tell: Intentional Harm and the Quest for Insurance Funding, 75 TEX. L. REV.
1721, 1729 (1997); see generally Francis J. Mootz III, Insurance Coverage of Employment
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insurance,195 the threat of having to defend a claim and possibly pay a
judgment may be further reduced.196 The agency can discriminate knowing
that, if it is sued, the insurance company will provide settlement funds, or pay
to swamp the plaintiffs with a vigorous defense197 without the agency having
to fund the settlement, defense, or, in the case of indemnity insurance, the
judgment.
B. Incentives for Victims of Discrimination
From the perspective of victims of discrimination, the benefits of filing
claims are twofold: vindication of their rights and the potential for the
recovery of damages. The previously discussed studies calculating damage
awards in housing discrimination cases overstate a complainant’s potential
recovery to an even higher degree than they overstate a respondent’s
potential sanction. This is because the studies often include attorneys’ fees198
and civil penalties199 in the amount of awards even though these sanctions are
paid to the complainants’ attorneys or the government.
The costs to victims of filing claims can be formidable. Complainants
have to participate in discovery, preparation of their claims, and trials. They
and their families may be subject to depositions and an array of inquiries into
their private lives. When complainants claim emotional distress damages,
respondents often have a right to psychotherapy records and, if the emotional
distress caused physical symptoms, complainants usually must produce their
medical records as well.200 Complainants also may be obliged to produce
Discrimination Claims, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1997).
195. Liability insurance for intentional torts is generally considered to be against public policy. See,
e.g., Windmill Pointe Village Club Ass’n v. State Farm Ins. Co., 779 F. Supp. 596, 598-99 (M.D. Fla.
1991) (holding that an insurance company did not have to indemnify or pay the costs of defending a
housing discrimination claim because it was an intentional tort and therefore against public policy for
the insurer to provide coverage).
Where state laws prohibit insurance companies from indemnifying defendants who have been
found liable for intentional torts, the law may permit insurance companies to pay the cost of settling an
intentional discrimination claim against their insured before there has been any decision on liability.
196. Insured real estate agencies do, however, run the risk that their insurers will increase their
premiums or deny them future insurance if they make a claim under their policies.
197. See Armstrong, supra note 18, at 919 n.56 (noting that generally the party discriminating will
have more financial resources to draw upon to out-litigate the victims of discrimination).
198. Attorneys’ fees are often the bulk of plaintiffs’ awards. See Allen, supra note 6, at 342-43.
199. Civil penalties are paid to the federal government. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
supra note 15, at 64.
200. For a discussion of defendants’ right to psychotherapy records when plaintiffs bring claims
for emotional distress damages, see generally David A. Robinson, Discovery of the Plaintiff’s Mental
Health History in an Employment Discrimination Case, 16 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 55 (1994). The
status of defendants’ rights to therapy records recently was called into question by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996). In Jaffee, the Court extended the
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their financial records if a respondent challenges their qualifications to rent or
buy the housing they were denied.201
Complainants who want to file their claims directly in court or to
intervene in an action filed by HUD or DOJ need to secure attorneys. This
can be a formidable obstacle for complainants who cannot afford or do not
want to pay an attorney on an hourly basis. Even altruistically oriented civil
rights attorneys202 have to consider the odds that their clients will prevail and
that the cases will generate sufficient income.203 Given that housing
discrimination cases are difficult to win,204 risk averse attorneys will be
reluctant to take housing discrimination claims on a contingency basis.205
Even when successful, attorneys have no guarantee that they will recover
their actual fees and costs.206 Although prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to
recover attorneys’ fees under the provisions of the Act, if a case settles,
attorneys are usually compensated based on a percentage of the settlement
amount207 and their clients waive any claim for statutory fees.208 A realistic
communications privilege to psychotherapists to preclude a defendant from obtaining a
psychotherapist’s records of communications with a plaintiff. Id. at 18. The Jaffee plaintiff did not
seek emotional distress damages so it is unclear whether the holding applies when plaintiffs bring
claims for emotional distress.
201. The burden-shifting formula set forth in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973), applies to housing discrimination cases in which there is no direct evidence. One element
of the complainant’s prima facie case is that he applied for and was qualified to rent or purchase the
unit he was denied. For an exhaustive list of cases applying McDonnell-Douglas to fair housing
claims, see SCHWEMM, supra note 12, at § 10.2 n.26.
202. This is not true for attorneys in the public or non-profit sectors or attorneys engaged in
periodic pro bono activities who derive their income from other sources.
203. See Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990’s: The Dichotomy Between
Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 208 (January 1997); Selmi, supra note 46, at 1452.
204. Selmi, supra note 46, at 1413. Between 1991 and 1994, HUD issued “cause” determinations
in only 15.6% of the complaints it investigated. Given that respondents prevailed in at least some of
the claims for which HUD found probable cause, the frequency with which respondents were found
liable in claims filed with HUD was less than 15.6%. Id.
205. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and their
Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1084 (1989) (citing evidence that hourly fee attorneys
accept cases that contingent fee attorneys reject because the former do not have to share the risk with
their clients).
206. See, e.g., Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F. Supp. 282, 287-88 (E.D. Ky. 1976) (awarding $730 for
attorneys’ fees even though defendant did not refute calculations in fee petition seeking $1500 in fees
and costs).
207. See Davies, supra note 203, at 199-200 (arguing that the process of settling civil rights cases
is now “the equivalent of a personal injury negotiation”).
208. In light of Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986), defendants can make it a condition of
settlement that plaintiffs’ counsel waive their right to fees. The possibility that a defendant might
condition settlement on a waiver of fees creates a further disincentive to attorneys accepting housing
discrimination cases. For a case discussing the ethical issues this creates for attorneys, see Lazar v.
Pierce, 757 F.2d 435, 437-39 (1st Cir. 1985), in which plaintiff’s counsel waived fees as a condition of
settlement and subsequently sought fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The attorney
unsuccessfully argued for fees on the grounds of duress: the defendant’s conditioning of the settlement
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lawyer who is deciding whether to accept a housing discrimination claim will
assume that the parties will settle prior to trial.209 Given the low settlement
amounts in housing discrimination claims and the high costs of litigation, the
attorney can expect to be poorly compensated if she accepts the case.210
For optimistic attorneys who evaluate cases based on the assumption that
they will recover statutory fees, there are hurdles that can arise with a fee
petition. Before awarding fees, a court has to determine whether the plaintiff
is entitled to attorney’s fees and, if so, whether the amount requested is
reasonable.211 Litigation of these issues can take as much time and as many
trips to court as the trial itself.212
Attorneys representing clients who intervene in HUD proceedings or
claims brought by the DOJ in court may have a difficult time proving that
their clients are entitled to attorneys’ fees and that the amounts are
reasonable. The Fair Housing Act allows intervenors to recover their
attorneys’ fees unless “special circumstances make the recovery of such fees
and costs unjust.”213 Special circumstances that would preclude an award
include a finding that the intervenor’s efforts “did not contribute to
on the waiver of attorneys’ fees “left [the attorney] no ethical choice but to settle under [the
defendants’] terms.” Id. at 437.
209. See THOMAS J. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW 156-57 (1997) (noting that less than 10%
of civil cases go to trial); see also SCHWEMM, supra note 12, at § 25.3(5)(b). It is not surprising, then,
that attorneys considering whether to accept housing discrimination claims consider the amount of
available damages more than they do the provisions for statutory attorneys’ fees. See Selmi, supra note
46, at 1453-54.
210. Davies describes the allocation of fees as a percentage of settlement as a partial fee waiver
because the actual time the attorney spent on a case exceeds what she is paid. See Davies, supra note
203, at 218.
211. See, e.g., HUD v. Dutra, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending
(Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,129, at 26,091 (May 13, 1997) (reducing attorneys’ fees claimed by over
40% on the grounds that counsel had spent an excessive amount of time prosecuting the case and
preparing the fee application); HUD v. Kelly, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair
Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,114, at 25,983-84 (Sept. 21, 1995) (declining to award fees for
excessive time spent on fee application, time spent on petition for rehearing that was never filed, and
time used securing a loan for complainant); HUD v. Dedham Hous. Auth., [2A HUD Administrative
Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,031, at 25,330 (May 26, 1992) (in
determining the fee award, reducing attorney’s hourly rate from $150 to $110).
212. See Selmi, supra note 46, at 1453 (discussing litigation of fee applications in Fair Housing
Act and Title VII cases).
In Marable v. H. Walker & Assocs., 644 F.2d 390, 397 (5th Cir. 1981), the court reversed the trial
court’s judgment for the defendants. On remand to assess damages and attorney’s fees, the trial court
reduced the attorney’s hourly rate and the number of hours he had expended. See Marable v. H.
Walker & Assocs., 704 F.2d 1219, 1221-22 (11th Cir. 1983). To collect his fees, the plaintiff again had
to file an appeal. See id. at 1222. See also City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 581 (1986) (in a
police misconduct cases, allowing attorneys’ fees 6 years after the jury rendered its verdict and after 2
appeals to the Supreme Court).
213. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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achieving” the favorable result.214 The combination of a significant risk of
losing and uncertain compensation can make housing discrimination claims
unappealing to attorneys215 and, in turn, prevent victims of discrimination
from securing representation.
C. The CLAC Method’s Effect on Incentives
The CLAC method will increase potential damage awards216 and will thus
cause victims of discrimination and landlords, sellers, and agents to adjust the
cost-benefit calculus they use in deciding whether to file claims or whether to
discriminate, respectively. For victims, the possibility of recovering several
thousand dollars in lost access to community damages may be enough to
motivate them to file a claim when they might not have done so otherwise.217
This will be especially true for those with little or no actual damages, and
those for whom it will be difficult to prove emotional distress.218 The larger
awards may also entice more attorneys to accept housing discrimination
claims.
For landlords, sellers, and agents, an increase in the amount of awards
will increase the cost of discriminating. This change in incentives likely will
be greatest for agents who work in areas that are gateways to upward
214. HUD v. Dutra, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law
& Bus.) ¶ 25,129, at 26,089 (May 13, 1997), quoting Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240, 247
(D.C. Cir. 1982). The court in Donnell held that factors to consider in determining whether an
intervenor contributed to the success of the litigation include: “whether the governmental litigant
adequately represented the intervenor[’s] interests by diligently prosecuting the case . . . whether the
intervenor[] proposed different theories and arguments . . . and whether the work it [sic] performed
was of important value to the court.” See Donnell, 682 F.2d at 249. For an application of this principle,
see, e.g., HUD v. Simpson, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen
Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,044, at 25,447 (Apr. 16, 1993) (awarding intervenor only half the requested fees, in
part, on the grounds that the attorney’s work “was of limited value to [the ALJ hearing the claim]”).
215. Professor Davies makes the same argument with respect to police misconduct cases in which
victims’ injuries are minor and thus insufficient to entice attorneys to take on their claims. See Davies,
supra note 203, at 199-200. She also notes that even when claims are meritorious attorneys are
reluctant to take on low damage cases. See id. at 233. In contrast, attorneys may be more willing to
accept the risk of losing an employment discrimination claim because actual damages such as lost
wages can be significant. As a result, the high risk is balanced or exceeded by the high potential return.
See generally id. at 265-66.
216. When complainants successfully bring lost access to community claims, their overall
compensatory awards will be larger because their lost access to community damages are in addition to
the damages that are already available to them. For example, a plaintiff with a lost access to
community claim also could have a claim for damages based on the unique value the unit had to him.
In addition, to the extent that courts are concerned with the ratio between actual and punitive awards,
larger compensatory awards can also lead to larger punitive awards.
217. Of course, only those potential complainants who have consulted with attorneys are likely to
know of the availability of lost access to community claims.
218. See supra note 181.
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mobility.
D. The Risk of Too Much Deterrence
Assuming that the CLAC method would, indeed, lead to larger awards in
housing discrimination cases, it is important to determine whether the
method would generate too much deterrence. An optimal enforcement
scheme should result in high compliance with the fair housing laws without
encouraging frivolous lawsuits or reducing the supply of housing.219
Although it may be impossible to know with precision whether damage
awards in fair housing cases are at optimal levels, some back-of-the-envelope
calculations suggest that the current level of awards may be too low.
Over the course of the first twenty years after the Fair Housing Act was
passed, there were four hundred reported federal fair housing decisions.220
Assuming that eight to fifteen percent of civil cases go to trial,221 a rough
estimate of the average number of federal housing discrimination claims filed
per year from 1968-1988 would be between 133 and 250. These figures need
to be adjusted to account for the fact that they do not reflect unreported
decisions, claims filed in state courts or agencies, or claims that settled.222
They also do not reflect the likely increase in filing rates since the 1988
amendments to the Fair Housing Act. A generous assumption would be that
the current number of housing discrimination claims filed in federal courts,
HUD, and state courts and agencies annually is ten times223 the larger of
these numbers, or 2500. There were an estimated two million incidents of
illegal housing discrimination each year between 1968 and 1988.224
Assuming that discrimination rates are at their historical levels, one incident
of discrimination is detected and pursued for every 800 incidents that occur.
219. For example, if potential sanctions are too high, landlords who are committed to
discriminating might elect to turn their rental units into condominiums and sell them, which could
reduce the number of available rental units in the community.
220. See Massey & Denton, supra note *, at 200 (citing GEORGE METCALF, FAIR HOUSING
COMES OF AGE (1988)).
221. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 405 (1982) (concluding that
85 to 90 percent of civil cases filed in federal court settle); David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of
Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 89 (1983) (summarizing data suggesting that slightly less
than 8% of civil suits filed in state and federal court go to trial).
222. On the other hand, by assuming that these decisions were not pre-trial, my calculations
actually overstate the number of claims filed.
223. A study of the percentage of employment discrimination claims that resulted in published
opinions in 1986 found that 27% of all claims result in published opinions. Peter Siegelman & John J.
Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished
Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1133, 1140 (1990).
224. See Kushner, supra note 5, at 1052.
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To assess the level of deterrence associated with a one in 800 rate of
enforcement, we also need to know the potential cost to a landlord, seller, or
agent of discriminating. The previously cited studies of damages in fair
housing cases225 revealed typical award levels of between $135.41 and
$41,829. Again, conservatively adjusting these levels upward by a factor of
ten to $1351 and $418,290, the expected cost of discriminating to a landlord,
seller, or agent would be somewhere between one dollar and sixty-nine cents,
and 522 dollars. In other words, the current enforcement system would fail to
deter a landlord whose private value from discriminating exceeded $522.226
This potential cost is low when, for example, you compare it to the thousands
of dollars it costs landlords to remove lead from rental units. Even when
using extremely conservative assumptions, these rough estimates indicate
that the expected cost of discriminating is lower than the financial benefits of
discriminating that accrue to many agents, sellers, and landlords.227
The low expected cost of discriminating is driven by very low
enforcement rates.228 These low enforcement rates are due, in part, to the fact
that discrimination is hard to detect.229 Flagrant discrimination is rare.230
Most landlords, agents, and sellers know their obligations under the fair
housing laws and employ subtle tactics231 to “put off” or reject applicants232
without revealing their discriminatory motives.233 Discrete discrimination is
difficult to detect, particularly at the contract formation stage when an
225. See supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
226. Of course, this assumes that the landlord is not risk averse and is not afraid of other factors
that could accompany allegations of discrimination, such as negative publicity.
227. See Kushner, supra note 5, at 1055 (arguing that sub-optimal awards are one explanation for
persistent housing discrimination); see also YINGER, supra note 7, at 214 (noting that “[e]ven with an
effective enforcement system, many housing agents will find a way to discriminate if they have a
strong financial incentive to do so”); Newburger, supra note 177, at 18 (arguing that the penalties for
discriminating must be at least as high as the cost of not discriminating).
For related discussions of economic efficiency in the context of Title VII, see John J. Donahue III,
Further Thoughts on Employment Discrimination Legislation: A Reply to Judge Posner, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 523 (1987); John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986); Richard
A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513 (1987).
228. This calculus may vary depending on where the agency is located. At least one authority,
Professor Kushner, argues that a few select cities with attorneys dedicated to fair housing generate
most of the fair housing decisions. See Kushner, supra note 5, at 1070.
229. See Armstrong, supra note 18, at 919 (“When enforcement is relatively uncertain, violators
are more likely to risk that their violations will not be prosecuted or that such prosecutions will be
unsuccessful.”).
230. Veronica M. Reed, Fair Housing Enforcement: Is the Current System Adequate?, in
RESIDENTIAL APARTHEID: THE AMERICAN LEGACY 223 (Robert Bullard et al. eds., 1994).
231. See Kushner, supra note 5, at 1070; see also Schwemm, supra note 9, at 754-55 (recognizing
the need for testers because “more subtle forms of rejection [have] become the norm”).
232. I use the term “applicants” to refer to both potential buyers and potential tenants.
233. See Hunter, supra note 181, at 1129-30 (providing examples of benign statements that are
used to conceal discriminatory motives).
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applicant does not know how the landlord, agent, or seller treated other
applicants.234 Slights and rejections are part of the search process. When they
occur, home-seekers move on to the next listing.
The presence of real estate agencies that are willing to screen applicants
on landlords’ and sellers’ behalf makes detection even harder. Agencies carry
an array of listings and can gather information about applicants before
deciding which dwellings to show them. When an applicant seeks the
services of an agency, the agency can sort through its listings and disclose
only those dwellings for which the applicant meets the landlords’ or sellers’
criteria.235 An agent who knows, for example, that a particular landlord only
will rent to whites, will not tell a black applicant about the landlord’s unit.236
The unsuspecting apartment-seeker will never know that the agency withheld
a listing from him. A landlord, particularly one with only a few units, cannot
discriminate this gracefully.237
There are times, however, when applicants do uncover discrimination.
For example, an applicant may become suspicious if a seller continues to
advertise that her home is for sale after telling the applicant that she had
234. See Reed, supra note 230, at 223. This is not true when applicants have “testers” inquire
about the same units. These “testers” not only help reveal the suspected discrimination, but also help
the plaintiffs prove their claims at trial. See Asbury v. Brougham, 866 F.2d 1276, 1280-81 (10th Cir.
1989) (noting that when the plaintiff inquired about renting a unit at an apartment complex, she was
told there were no vacancies; however, her white sister-in-law, who went to the same complex the next
day, was told there were apartments available immediately); HUD v. Leiner, [2A HUD Administrative
Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,021, at 25,262 (Jan. 3, 1992) (after
pregnant, black complainant was told apartment she sought had been rented, co-worker called rental
agent who told her about an available apartment that fit the description of the unit that the landlord had
denied complainant); see also Roberts, supra note 9, at 276 (“Because housing discrimination is often
practiced with a ‘handshake and a smile’ there is tremendous difficulty in proving discrimination
unless testers are available.”).
235. See, e.g., Johnson v. Jerry Pals Real Estate, 485 F.2d 528, 530 (7th Cir. 1973) (citing
evidence that in response to a query whether he would rent to blacks, a real estate agent said,”[w]e
don’t have to show them everything. Ha. We can misplace a few pages”).
It is unlikely that agents refuse to show units that they have specifically advertised; however, they
can advertise in ways that allow them to discriminate. They can use general descriptions of available
units, e.g. “several two and three bedroom apartments available,” without disclosing the addresses or
other identifying information. When home-seekers respond to the ads, agents can determine which two
or three bedroom apartments would be “appropriate” to show the tenants. The more listings an agent
has, the more opportunities she has to discriminate. Agents “discriminate when the circumstances are
‘right.’” See YINGER, supra note 7, at 39.
236. Agencies can advertise only those units owned by non-discriminatory landlords and keep a
stash of discriminatory listings that they only disclose to applicants who meet the landlords’ criteria.
See YINGER, supra note 7, at 165.
237. Landlords with high incentives to discriminate will be the most inclined to use real estate
agencies. For example, landlords with units containing lead paint have a powerful financial incentive to
discriminate. By steering families away from leaded units, agencies can insulate landlords from the risk of
paying damages for lead poisoning or the cost of de-leading their units.
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accepted an offer on the house. Similarly, a landlord’s policies238 or manner
in rejecting an applicant239 can cause an applicant to question the landlord’s
sincerity and motives.240 When an applicant does detect discrimination, he
still has to decide whether the benefits of filing a claim exceed the costs.
E. The Virtues of the CLAC Method Over Punitive Sanctions
When compensatory damages do not generate sufficient deterrence,
punitive sanctions are intended to punish and increase deterrence.241 For a
number of reasons, punitive damages and civil penalties do not serve their
intended role in fair housing cases. First, punitive damage awards in general
are neither frequent nor significant.242 Second, although a finding of
intentional discrimination under the Fair Housing Act arguably supports
imposition of punitive damages on the grounds that the plaintiff proved either
that the defendant acted with intent or that she lied about her motives,243
factfinders are not always inclined to award punitive damages based on a
violation of the Act alone. Instead, they often require evidence that the
defendant’s behavior was egregious before allowing a punitive award.244
238. In Asbury, 866 F.2d 1276, the managing agent of an apartment complex had a policy of
telling anyone who called the company inquiring about available units that there were no vacancies
and encouraging the callers to visit the office. Id. at 1282. As the court noted, this enabled the
management company to identify the race of the applicants before making representations about the
availability of units. Id.
239. See, e.g., Barrett v. Realty World, 17 Mass. Discrimination Law Rep. 1665, 1668 (1995)
(complainant felt suspicious following rejection by real estate agency).
240. An applicant who detects discrimination still may not know that the landlord, seller, or agent
violated the law.
241. When a law is under-enforced, punitive damages further the deterrent function of the law.
See MICELI, supra note 209, at 35 (noting that, from an economics perspective, punitive damages are
justified where there are enforcement “errors”).
242. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 304-07 (1987); see, e.g., Baumgardner v. HUD, 960 F.2d at 573, 583 (6th Cir. 1992) (reducing a
$4000 punitive damage award to $1500 against a landlord who usually did not engage in
discrimination).
243. See SCHWEMM, supra note 12, at § 25.3(3)(b).
244. See ROBERTS, supra note 9, at 276-77; see, e.g., Crumble v. Blumthal, 549 F.2d 462, 467
(7th Cir. 1977) (affirming trial court’s denial of punitive damage award and holding that “the fact that
a wrong is an intentional act does not compel an award of punitive damages”); Miller v. Towne Oaks
East Apts., 797 F. Supp. 557, 562 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (awarding compensatory damages after finding
that apartment manager violated the Fair Housing Act, but declining to award punitives because the
defendant’s conduct was not “egregious enough”); United States v. Lepore, 816 F. Supp. 1011, 1024
(M.D. Pa. 1991) (disallowing punitive damages on grounds that the defendants’ conduct was not
“egregious enough” even though defendants knew that they were violating the law); but cf. United
States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 936 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding in light of evidence that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiffs that district court erred in directing a verdict for the
defendant on plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages).
The recent Supreme Court decision in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999),
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Most landlords and real estate agencies know their responsibilities under the
fair housing laws and are unlikely to engage in overt and offensive
discrimination that would qualify as egregious.245 Similarly, where there is
no evidence that defendants were motivated by ill will, factfinders may be
disinclined to impose heavy sanctions.246
Third, in deciding whether to award and the size of a punitive sanction,
ALJs and courts consider the size and financial condition of the respondent
or defendant.247 Because most landlords, sellers, and real estate agencies are
individuals or small entities with limited assets,248 when civil penalties or
punitive damages are awarded, they tend to be low.
Lastly, when a court or ALJ concludes that punitive sanctions are
appropriate, there are explicit and implicit limits on the awards. The Fair
Housing Act explicitly limits civil penalties to $11,000 for first offenders.249
At best, these small penalties marginally increase deterrence. Implicit limits
on punitive damages may further reduce awards. The implicit limits arise
calls into question the legality of the “egregious” requirement some courts have imposed in assessing
punitive damages in housing discrimination cases. In Kolstad, the Court reviewed a D.C. Circuit en
banc holding that a jury could not consider a punitive damages claim under Title VII because there
was no evidence that the defendant’s conduct was egregious. The Supreme Court rejected the District
Court’s requirement that the defendant’s conduct be egregious and held that “an employer must at least
discriminate in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law to be liable in
punitive damages.” Id. at 2124-25. Given that courts have looked to Title VII for guidance in
interpreting the Fair Housing Act, Kolstad likely signals that courts will retreat from the egregiousness
requirement in fair housing cases.
245. See Schwemm, supra note 63, at 120. This is less of an issue in HUD proceedings, where
ALJs tend to impose civil penalties upon a finding of intentional discrimination alone. See SCHWEMM,
supra note 12, at § 24.9(4). The egregiousness of the defendants’ behavior influences the amount, but
not the likelihood, of the penalty.
246. See, e.g.,. Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of
Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49 (1998) (finding that the level of jurors’ outrage at a
defendant’s actions influences the amount they award in punitive damages); see, e.g., HUD v. Dutra,
[2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,129, at
26,089 (May 13, 1997) (noting that civil penalty of $5000 had been imposed on the respondent
because respondent had committed a “serious violation”); HUD v. Welch, [2A HUD Administrative
Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.) ¶ 25,125, at 26,071 (Dec. 2, 1996)
(imposing a $2000 penalty where landlord discriminated out of concern for the safety of children who
were potential tenants).
The level of civil penalties may also be influenced by the type of claim. One study found that the
typical civil penalty in a familial status housing discrimination claim is $2000. See Allen, supra note 6,
at 353.
247. See, e.g., Phillips v. Hunter Trails Community Ass’n, 685 F.2d 184, 191 (7th Cir 1982);HUD
v. Blackwell, [2A HUD Administrative Decisions] Fair Housing-Fair Lending (Aspen Law & Bus.)
¶ 25,001, at 25,017 (Dec. 21, 1989), enforced, 908 F.2d 864, 873-74 (11th Cir. 1990).
248. See Schwemm, supra note 181, at 380-81.
249. The caps increase with each violation. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g)(3) (1994); 24 C.F.R. §
180.670(b)(3)(iii) (1999).
As of 1998, ALJs had only heard cases involving first-offender respondents. See SCHWEMM,
supra note 12, at § 24.9(4).
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from courts’ reliance on reference points that lead to deflated awards. For
example, one factor in assessing the reasonableness of a punitive damage
award is the disparity between the punitive award and available civil
penalties, which are capped.250 Similarly, although there is no requirement
that the amount of a punitive damage award bear an exact relationship to the
amount of the compensatory award,251 courts consider the amount of any
compensatory award in determining the reasonableness of a punitive
award.252 To the extent adjudicators base punitive damage awards on low
compensatory awards and civil penalties, they fail to resolve the problem of
under-enforcement.
Certain features of the CLAC method may make it a better source of
additional deterrence than punitive sanctions.253 The amount of damages
awarded using the CLAC method does not depend on factors external to a
complainant’s injury. For example, the size and financial resources of the
respondent will have no bearing on the amount of a complainant’s award for
lost access to community benefits. Similarly, the egregiousness of the
respondent’s behavior, as well as her wealth, will be irrelevant to the
calculation of an award using the CLAC method. Lastly, awards in other
cases and civil penalty provisions will not influence the size of the
complainant’s lost access to community award.
The final virtue of CLAC-based damages is their precision. Awards based
on the CLAC method compensate for an actual injury and generate a specific
dollar amount in damages. In contrast, the decision whether to award
250. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583-84 (1996); see also Broome v.
Demou, 17 F. Supp.2d 211, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (applying BMW to uphold punitive damage claim, in
part, on the grounds that it was not “disproportionately excessive” when compared with available civil
penalties under the Fair Housing Act).
251. See generally BMW of North America, Inc., 517 U.S. at 582-83 (discussing the absence of a
limit on the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages for the purpose of determining the
constitutionality of punitive awards).
252. In Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 1978), the plaintiff brought a housing
discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1982. The jury had awarded her compensatory damages of $1
and punitive damages of $5000. Id. at 488. The Court reversed the punitive damages award based on
the disparity between the compensatory and punitive awards. Id. at 492, 495. See also Baumgardner,
960 F.2d 572, 583 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that civil penalty, which exceeded the compensatory
award, was “excessive, unjust and improper”).
253. Other solutions to observed under-enforcement and inadequate deterrence include addressing
the problem at the detection stage by instituting wide-spread testing programs. Testing would require a
significant commitment from the government, which at this point appears illusive. See Selmi, supra
note 46, at 1425-27.
Another proposal has been to find a justification for larger punitive awards. Alex Navarro
proposes a formula for calculating punitive damages in cases brought by testers that takes into account
under-enforcement of fair housing laws and that would generate larger punitive awards in tester cases.
See Alex S. Navarro, Note, Bona Fide Damages for Tester Plaintiffs: An Economic Approach to
Private Enforcement of the Antidiscrimination Statutes, 81 GEO. L.J. 2727 (1993).
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punitive sanctions and how much to award are arbitrary. Adjudicators who
are disinclined to make arbitrary awards may feel more confident awarding
lost access to community damages because they are capable of precise
calculation.254
F. Summary
The available data suggest that deterrents in the current enforcement
scheme are insufficient to prevent discrimination by many landlords, sellers,
and agents. It is therefore unlikely that the added deterrence the CLAC
method may provide will be excessive.255 In fact, the CLAC method may
provide the deterrence that punitive sanctions should, but do not, provide.
IV. CONCLUSION
In 1992, Congress authorized the establishment of a program entitled
Moving to Opportunity, which allows low-income renters to use federally-
subsidized housing vouchers to rent units in suburban communities.256 This
program demonstrates that Congress is aware of the need to create housing
opportunities for people who seek to move up the residential hierarchy.
Distributing housing vouchers will not create the intended mobility as long as
housing discrimination persists. By recognizing the injury people experience
when denied access to desirable communities and adopting the CLAC
method, we can increase compliance with the fair housing laws and begin to
remedy the inequality created by housing discrimination without altering the
existing remedial scheme or generating excessive deterrence.
254. Adjudicators who are concerned about being reversed on appeal may also feel more
confident awarding damages based on the CLAC method than punitive sanctions. See supra notes 158-
59 and accompanying text.
255. See Schwemm, supra note 63, at 105 (“[R]eliance on private suits as the primary
enforcement mechanism of the fair housing statutes means that damage awards must be substantial
enough to serve the functions of deterrence and vindication as well as compensation.”).
256. Paula Beck, Fighting Section 8 Discrimination: The Fair Housing Act’s New Frontier, 31
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 156-57 (1996); W. Dennis Keating, The Parma Housing Racial
Discrimination Remedy Revisited, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 235, 249 n.89 (1997).
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